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ABSTRACT

In this history and aralysis cf Federal educational prcjects in the Anacostia area of the District cf Cclumbia frcm 1967 to 1977 the origins and development cf the Aracostia Community School Prcject (1967-72) and its successor, the Fespcnse to Educational Needs Project (1972-77) are described. The requirements cf implementation studies are discussed, with particular emphasis on Anacostia's experience. A summary cf pclitical events in Anacostia is given. Fcur major conclusions on the Anaccstia experience are presented: (1) that conventional policy making and implementation was inappropriate in Anacostia; (2) that the implementaticn prccess occured before the definition of policy; (3) that the Anaccstia community had its cwn ccncerns separate frcm thcse cf both Federal and local educational authorities; and (4) participants (ccmmunity, local, Federal) persistently failed tc agree upcn a ccmmcr pclicy. Implications of the Anacostia experience are discussed. They cover the mutual adjustment scenario, the bargaining scenaric, and the political power scenaric. A chrcnclcgical summary cf critical events in the history of the Aracostia Community Schocl Prcject and the Respcnse to Educational Needs Project is included. (Authcr/MC)

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CHANGING ANACOSTIA: DEFINITION AND IMPLEMENTATION

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the history of federally supported school projects in the Anacostia region of the District of Columbia. We show that President Johnson initiated the program without a clear definition of the policy to be implemented, having decided on neither the specific goals to be implemented nor the means for achieving them. The United States Office of Education and the District of Columbia Public Schools, the donor and recipient of funds, chose an elected community board (the Anacostia Community School Board) as the body responsible for the initial definition of policy. The resulting projects were known as the Anacostia Community School Project (ACSP 1967-72) and the Response to Educational Needs Project (RENP 1972-77). ACSP and later RENP were to define the policy, with approval from DCPS and federal agencies (first USOE and later the National Institute of Education), and to implement agreements by deploying the staff and other resources under community control.

We conclude that this process failed to produce early agreement on policy, and that policy definition and policy implementation occurred simultaneously and continuously throughout the ten-year history of the projects. We outline three scenarios by which a definitive policy agreement might have been achieved by community, local and federal actors: agreement through mutual adjustment around common goals, agreement through bargaining over divergent goals, and agreement imposed through the authoritative use of political power. Our analysis shows why the conditions for each scenario were absent in the Anacostia experience, and isolates the specific factors producing the failure of each scenario.

INTRODUCTION

This is a history and analysis of federal educational projects in the Anacostia area of the District of Columbia from 1967 to 1977. Specifically we describe origins and development of the Anacostia Community School Project (1967-72) and its successor, the Response to Educational Needs Project (1972-77). These projects--administered by the United States Office of Education and later the National Institute of Education--were intended to improve schooling in a troubled, low-income, black area through community participation and other means. Our data are drawn from interviews with participants and from documents and records contained in the files of the projects, federal educational agencies, and private organizations.*

Our work has three main purposes. First, we want to describe what happened and why. Second, we want to arrive at some general conclusions about the Anacostia experience, placing it within the context of general implementation problems. Third, we want to isolate the lessons Anacostia holds for policy-makers contemplating alternative strategies to improve education. After an introduction orienting the reader to the location of this study within the implementation literature, the remainder of this paper

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*This study is supported by a contract administered by Gibboney Associates from the National Institute of Education. The work reflects only the conclusions of the authors, and is not endorsed by Gibboney Associates or NIE in any way.

is divided according to our substantive areas of concern: history, analysis and lessons.

Studying implementation: We believe that the requirements of implementation studies, as outlined in the literature, imposes an initial and important limitation on what our case study can add. Our case material does not lend itself to a study of implementation as a single means-ends relationship. In the next section, however, we outline the contributions we can make despite this initial limitation.

The literature on policy implementation is a new and growing one. While particular case studies of governmental programs have been with us for some time, the explicit focus on "implementation" as a research perspective has not. This new literature is new because it addresses a common core of policy questions through the adoption of a common perspective. The major and distinctive concern of implementation research is to produce prescriptive, or policy-relevant, studies. Implementation researchers are concerned with case studies insofar as they show the advantages and pitfalls of alternative change strategies.

An assumption of implementation researchers is that their findings are relevant across the traditional boundaries of case-specific subject areas. Thus the students of implementation engage in a dialogue which assumes that the experi-

ence of a jobs program in Oakland[1] is relevant to mental commitment laws in California[2] and to HEW school desegregation efforts in Washington and the nation.[3] This dialogue clarifies the problems policy-makers encounter in trying to improve the delivery of services through intermediaries.

Implicit in the dialogue about implementation is the perspective of the policy-maker who wants to change the world in a desired direction. Each case study is the specification of how well or how poorly the specific policy under study was implemented and why. Success or failure is measured against the goals of the policy maker. The study of implementation involves the problem of evaluating the success of officials in "translating broad agreement into specific decisions, given a wide range of participants and perspectives."[4] The degree to which those goals are actually achieved through specific decisions, then, is the test of the degree of implementation achieved.

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[1]Pressman, Jeffrey L. and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

[2]Bardach, Eugene, The Implementation Game (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977).

[3]Radin, Beryl, Implementation, Change and the Federal Bureaucracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978).

[4]Pressman and Wildavsky, op. cit., p. 6.

The initial difficulty in studying implementation is, then, defining the policy being implemented: defining what it is that the policy maker hopes to achieve and how. Pressman and Wildavsky state the dictionary definition of implementation as "to carry out, accomplish, fulfill, produce, complete."[1] Then they proceed to define the policy being carried out, accomplished and produced in specific enough terms to sustain analysis. This is an essential first step. The intent of policy makers has to be specific enough to constitute a baseline against which success or failure can be measured. Measuring implementation is akin to measuring political power: we must know the goals of the initiator of implementation or of the person reputed to be powerful before attributing success or failure to either.

The difficulty is that complex policies often do not lend themselves to clear statements about which of the policy maker's general or proximate goals is being implemented. Often policy-makers state their goals in vague and imprecise forms. This is so because the policy maker may know generally what he hopes to achieve--less pollution, illiteracy, unemployment--but he is not certain how goals should be achieved or at what price. In policy areas like the environment, education and the economy, this problem is exacerbated by uncertainties arising out of the complex social, organizational and political environments in

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[1] Pressman and Wildavsky, ibid., p. xiii).

which changes are to occur.

The difficulty in finding clear statements of goals and means for any large-scale governmental policy--not just implementation of new policies--has been repeatedly encountered. The debate over PPBS (Planning, Programming, Budgeting Systems), for example, turned on the inability of analysts to formulate specific goals acceptable to politicians and bureaucrats against which expenditures could be measured.[1] On a more theoretical level, Charles Lindblom (1968) argued that this confusion about goals stemmed from the incremental method of decision-making in which agreement on goals was typically not secured prior to the adoption of a specific policy.

Others stress the contingent nature of politics--the need to respond to changing electoral demands--as a source of unreliability in understanding politicians' constantly reformulated goals.[2] Whatever the cause, the absence of clear statements of policy goals and the means to achieve them is not a feature unique to implementation studies alone.

Theodore Lowi (1969) analyzes American national policy-making in terms consistent with Lindblom. He argues

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[1]Schlesinger, James, "Systems Analysis and the Political Process," in D. Sullivan, J. Pressman, R. Winters, and R. Nakamura, eds., How America is Ruled (New York: John Wiley, forthcoming).

[2]Wills, Gary, "Hurrah for Politicians," Harper's Magazine, September, 1975.

that national policy makers typically state goals in rather vague and abstract terms. Then these policy makers--Congress and the President--grant legislative discretion and resources to others, usually governmental agencies, to further define these goals by devising the specific means to carry them out. This process of definition is characterized by bargaining and adjustments between the governmental agencies and attentive publics of interest groups who will be affected by the resulting policies. Appeals from this process can be made back up to political decision-makers or carried through the courts. This approach seems to be most common in areas where goals can be stated clearly in the abstract--end discrimination based on race, sex, physical handicaps, clean-up the air, water or land--but whose achievement may be technically or politically complex.

As we shall see, the Anacostia case is an example of a project whose implementation began before policy was degined as a specific statement of ends and means. Thus our work is not a conventional implementation study; it does not compare the project's accomplishments against the prescriptions and goals of the policy. Instead our contribution to implementation research is in clarifying the difficulties involved when policy makers decide to leave the definition of policy to those charged with implementation.

Studying Anacostia: The history of the Anacostia projects will not sustain an implementation study in the conventional sense of evaluating the degree to which a change initially posited by policy makers was achieved or not achieved. As we shall see, President Johnson's initial proposal outlined vague and abstract goals and did not specify the means for achieving them. The more specific goals--developed by community participants, federal agencies, and congressional staff people during the course of the projects--were objects of controversy rather than consensus. While some common goals did exist--to improve education in Anacostia--these were often stated at so high a level that agreement was not meaningful, and such goals rarely indicated that one preferred means was superior to another.

On a more specific level, there were divergences among the goals of the various community, local and federal participants. The history of the Anacostia projects touches upon a number of recent educational themes, each reified in the goals of particular actors. Community participants became committed to the community control themes current in the 1960s. Federal actors, over time, became committed to the educational management and experiment themes of the early 1970s: management by objectives requiring the identification of specific goals and means, as well as stress on the production of evaluable results. Finally, local school

officials and others came to emphasize the "back to basics" themes of the late 1970s. At times, these specific goal differences constituted a basis for conflict as well as cooperation in policy definition.

Such specific goal differences were not the only basis of conflict over preferred policies. The implementation of the project itself altered the organizational environment in which policy alternatives were considered. An apparatus for community participation was created before the policy was defined, and this community body became an important focus for project energies. A new political unit was founded in a poor community where none had existed before, and it served to articulate demands unanticipated by policy makers and their agents.

Community actors also developed resources--links with politicians, the capacity to mobilize citizens for demonstrations, skills in the use of mass media--to back their demands against the preferences of federal and local educational authorities.

So because of conflicts in participant preferences about goals and means, and the existence of organizations capable of sustaining differences in the face of challenges, differences in policy had to be resolved through politics. In this paper we will concentrate on the political lessons held by the Anacostia experience. Our colleague, Dr. Bruce Cooper, deals elsewhere with the educational innova-

tions spawned by the projects.[1] The basis of these political lessons, our summary of the history of the Anacostia projects, is contained in the next section to be followed by a discussion of specific conclusions from that history and by a section on lessons for policy makers.

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[1] Cooper, 1978.

I. A SUMMARY OF POLITICAL EVENTS IN ANACOSTIA

In this section we summarize our understanding of the events. Since the analysis does not follow a strict chronological sequence, a summary of events has been appended to the conclusion of the paper (see Appendix 1).

Historically Anacostia had been considered a backwater section of Washington, geographically isolated and economically underdeveloped. During the 1950s, immediately preceding the Johnson Administration's 1967 decision to create the Anacostia Community School Project (ACSP), the area had undergone a number of changes. Anacostia's black population had increased while the population of the rest of the city had declined. The area's educational and other institutions experienced strain as schools became overcrowded and the requirements of the larger and increasingly disadvantaged population for social services increased.

At the time of President Lyndon Johnson's decision to create a "Model School Experiment" in Washington, the perceived shortcomings of Washington schools had produced a crowded agenda for educational reform as well as judicial and political demands for change. The educational agenda had been defined by an outside study, the Passow Report, and the judicial agenda by a series of decisions on inte-

gration and equalization of educational opportunities issued by Judge Skelly Wright.

The Johnson Administration's desire for immediate and visible educational results in Washington, as well as financial constraints, led the President and his advisors to limit the scope of their efforts to a geographically compact area within the District of Columbia. The White House reasoned that a great increase in the resources available to a few schools would be more likely to produce results. The administration proposed a "Model School Experiment" which was to involve community participation and was intended to produce an example for other urban districts to emulate.

A variety of factors determined this approach including: the District's needs; the administration's immediate past experiences with the poverty program; and the political and racial unrest of the 1960s. The resulting proposal left the statement of educational goals and the means to achieve those goals purposely vague. These ambiguities were to be resolved by the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS). DCPS and USOE were made responsible for devising a plan which would give the President's proposal substance and specificity.

Since Johnson's proposal envisioned community participation, the first decision facing DCPS was the selection of a site for the project. Once a site was selected, and

a community of participants identified in Anacostia, further specification of means and ends proceeded.

The initial drafting stages of Anacostia's Proposal were influenced by both DCPS and USOE through their liaison personnel and consultants. Anacostia community organizations and citizens gathered in a Summer Institute administered by an Ad Hoc Planning Council, and funded by DCPS-USOE--to formulate the specific proposal. A number of important differdnces among participants emerged; among them were differences over the nature of community participation, the scope of project activities and relations between the community and schools. A broad proposal budgeted at $15 million was submitted to DCPS and USOE by Anacostia residents.

At this point, congressional opposition to funding President Mohnson's proposal unexpectedly materialized. After a period of mobilization and negotiations by Anacostia groups, DCPS, and the White House, about $1 million was appropriated by Congress for the first year. This reduction in funding necessitated a reconsideration of the proposals and a re-calibration of priorities. The Anacostia Community School Project, using interim funds from DCPS, got underway by hiring community people as aides and establishing its own administrative structure.

The goal of community participation, ambiguously stated by President Johnson, took concrete form in repre-

sentative organizations. This created for the first time community-wide bodies dapable of broad representation of Anacostia in its relations with the city and federal governments.

The community participation component of the Anacostia projects resulted from the influence of professional outsiders, but the belief in community participation rapidly took hold in Anacostia. Anacostia participants came to believe that community participation, at all levels and stages of project development, was the defining characteristics of their enterprise. While educational goals were considered important, community bodies were regarded by participants as nearly sovereign units which could define how these vague goals were to be achieved. This view of the sovereignty of community units later put Anacostia participants into conflict with federal educational agencies over a series of practical matters.

The Community Steering Committee (or Planning Council) emerged as the dominant political unit speaking for Anacostia in its relations with the city and federal governments.[1] Initially, the representative body consisted of people from a number of Anacostia organizations including agencies, churches, civic associations, etc., but participants decided

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[1]While the exact names and composition of the representative bodies change over time, their function remains much the same for the project's history.

quite early that the most desirable claim to representativeness rested on having a popularly elected base. Thus Anacostia participants decided to elect representatives to a series of neighborhood boards and to an areawide community school board.

Our examination of the apparatus of representation generated by the Anacostia community included a focus on the evolution of these representative units, namely the elements which changed and those which remained stable. By examining the composition of board membership from 1968 through 1977, we explored sources of underlying continuities of interests as well as the sources of discontinuities.

One hitherto unreported trend in Anacostia organizations which we have uncovered is the change in the board's composition caused by a widening definition of Anacostia. While board activities, as shown in our analysis of meeting records, continued to focus on the project, the membership of the board changed as the boundaries of Anacostia expanded due to DCPS decisions, such as the decisions to "decentralize" the administrative structure of District schools. While Anacostia was initially defined narrowly to include primarily poor areas, the boundaries of Anacostia and of the community board expanded over time to include more prosperous segments of Washington's far southeast. This shift resulted in changes in the social and economic composition of the Anacostia board, which presently includes

members with greater bureaucratic and administrative experience from high status occupations.

Our analysis of the board also extended to an examination of the board's concerns as reflected in its records over time. The board minutes reflect discussions of substantive educational issues, as well as a great deal of interest in the details of administering the project and the area's schools.

Thus far we have explained the development of representative community bodies in Anacostia in terms of community-related factors. But these developments could not have occurred without support and discretion from USOE and the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS). These organizations, USOE as the source of federal funds for the project, and DCPS as the nominal recipient, permitted the Anacostia board to exercise effective control over project activities--the hiring of staff and defining of project activities--and thereby provided it with resources which made it an important political arena.

Next we will describe USOE's initial position on Anacostia, and then analyze some of the factors which led the agency to reverse that position.

During the Johnson years, USOE was supportive of Anacostia as a community controlled project and granted it substantial latitude in defining and administering activities. USOE support resulted from the efforts of friendly

project officers, and the occasional intervention of high OE officials. This support was given over the objection of others in the USOE career bureaucracy.

The Nixon Administration introduced new USOE personnel and diminished the organization's support for a community controlled Anacostia Project. At the request of the Bureau of the Budget (in 1971), USOE re-evaluated the Project and decided to discontinue federal financial support. USOE contended that because the project had failed on fiscal, educational, managerial, and participatory grounds it was not worthy of continued support. The process of evaluation included a reformulation of project goals by USOE evaluators.

Anacostia leaders responded effectively to the termination by a combination of tactics: a sit-in, skillful use of the mass media to publicize their cause, and the mobilization of allies in city government and on Capitol Hill. As a result, Commissioner Marland compromised. The Anacostia Community School Project was terminated but was replaced with a comparable project under a new name, Response to Educational Needs Project (RENP).

At this point, a new set of organizational actors became important shapers of RENP's future: Congress and the National Institute of Education. Congress, responding to an initiative by the Nixon Administration, created the National Institute of Education in 1972. As part of this

congressional action, responsibility for RENP was taken from USOE and given to NIE.

NIE faced the task of trying to reconcile its research mission with the constraints imposed by Congress. NIE was given several goals including advancing the state of educational research, but NIE's budget was assembled by the transfer of a number of existing USOE and OEO (Office of Economic Opportunity) programs and a modest infusion of new money. There was an initial contradiction between NIE's mission and the materials provided in the budget. Existing programs therefore had to be re-shaped to conform to the new funding agency's mission. This was a particularly serious problem because many of the programs inherited from other agencies (like RENP from USOE) had had troublesome histories.

NIE's general moves to reconcile its mission with the responsibilities of running inherited programs led to a number of difficulties with Congress. NIE sought to "improve" those inherited programs by making their potential contributions to educational research more explicit, or by eliminating them entirely, thus freeing money for research. In a number of instances, NIE's decisions were appealed by program recipients to Congress. This gave Congress the impression that NIE was failing to do its job of building good relations with practitioner groups, which would be the ultimate customers for NIE's findings. The role of Congress

as an appeals body was abetted by increasing conflicts between the Nixon Administration and the Democratic Congress.

NIE's dealings with RENP were influenced by this larger context of NIE-congressional relations in a number of ways. First, NIE's decision to re-evaluate RENP in light of the Institute's research mission and standards was part of a larger set of such moves in other inherited programs. Second, the decision by Congress to serve as an appeals body for NIE decisions, made the Institute sensitive to the political dimension of such decisions, and introduced the possibility of congressional intervention into the agency's calculations about its programs. Third, the congressional response to NIE's treatment of RENP was influenced by their perception of NIE's general competence and concerns.

Direct relations between the National Institute of Education (NIE) and the Response to Educational Needs Project (RENP) were characterized by conflict and cooperation. Conflicts grew out of the differences in priorities between the two organizations. NIE wanted a research project consistent with its organizational mission. RENP, as the earlier reference to the Anacostia projects indicated, wanted to retain its ongoing commitment to community participation.

NIE favored a research oriented project which requires a clear statement of goals, the specification of

means, an explicit process wherein means are implemented, documentation of activities, and the measurement of results. RENP, on the other hand, favored a community control project with different requirements including the capacity to reformulate and change both means and goals as community sentiment changed, and a search for results which were suggestive rather than scientifically valid.

Thus, NIE and RENP had two different conceptions of the project, which led to conflicts between the organizations, but there were also incentives for cooperation. Neither side could achieve its goals without the help of the other, so each had an interest in bargaining to resolve differences in a cooperative fashion.

NIE's bargaining strategy depended upon RENP's cooperation, and was backed by the threat to terminate funding. NIE asked RENP to be more explicit about goals and objectives by defining what was to be done, by whom and when. RENP was asked to justify its activities in light of agreed-upon objectives, and to make tangible progress toward meeting those objectives. The situation was much like that sparked by managerial innovations such as Management by Objectives (MBO), Program Budgeting (PPBS), and most recently Zero Based Budgeting (ZBB). If goals are agreed-upon, organizational progress can be measured by the extent to which their available means are used to attain those goals. In the case of RENP, the policy

goal was identified as improving the teaching of reading and mathematics through means of program of in-service training supplemented by the work of community aides. Tangible progress was to have been measured by the extent to which RENP resources were used to create math and reading centers in the schools, recruit and train specialists to instruct teachers, train and organize the community aides to contribute to this central activity, and to instruct teachers in new methods appropriate for disadvantaged children. Final results were to have been judged by the extent to which the children themselves improved in objective measures of their reading and mathematics skills.

NIE's immediate goal was, then, to stimulate RENP to alter its behavior in order to produce an evaluable educational experiment. The negotiating process, with its threat of termination, was the means to that proximate goal. NIE hoped that the negotiations would lead RENP to narrow its objectives to a few [illegible] technically achievable goals and to mobilize its resources in behalf of those objectives.

For its part, RENP resisted NIE's efforts to make it rationalize its objectives and to meet a schedule of measurable progress. Because of Anacostia's commitment to community control, RENP preferred to maintain as much discretion over its activities as possible. Any narrowing of goals would have required RENP to change its existing

structure either directly (through the elimination or reduction of existing program components) or indirectly (by reducing the co mmunity board's control over project administration). RENP's structure had evolved over time, and was vested with political significance. It was an employer of community residents; it conferred status and power on board members; it served as a sounding board for community concerns over schooling. The revised proposals sent by RENP to NIE reflected RENP's preference for leaving its structure and discretion intact. Even when RENP agreed to a specific policy, it would maintain its discretion and structure by not complying with the conditions of the agreement.

A host of bargaining strategies were used by both sides to achieve their different goals. NIE increased the frequency and specificity of negotiations as a device to increase the likelihood of RENP compliance. By linking continued funding to compliance with specific agreements, NIE hoped to provide RENP with an incentive for cooperation.

RENP, too, used a variety of tactics. RENP's failures to comply were often blamed on complex and slow DCPS procecures beyond Anacostia control. Also the RENP board used project directors to block NIE's efforts to commit them. NIE often had to deal through intermediaties such as the project directors who served at the pleasure of the RENP board. From time to time, the RENP board would fire a project director, blaming him/her for a failure to comply with negotiated agreements or for having concluded undesirable

agreements. In either case, NIE was forced to begin policy negotiations again, thereby giving the community board several more months of discretion and control.

One important consequence of NIE-RENP bargaining was a late change in the balance of power within the project itself. The position of the project's professional staff--primarily that of the Project Director--was enhanced toward the end of this period (1976-77). The initial effect of NIE-RENP negotiations had been to induce great turnover at the Project Director level. Frequent negotiations, and specific deadlines for performance, had been opportunities for Director-Board conflicts as well as chances for the Director to fail to meet deadlines.

Toward the end of this period, however, circumstances had changed to the point where NIE demands could strengthen the role of the Director. The project's strongest friends on the congressional staff had left the Hill, which made NIE's threat to cut off funds for non-performance more credible. The membership of the Board changed to include members more sympathetic to a professional director. Under these circumstances, the last project director was able to use NIE's demands to comply with negotiated agreements as a device for centralizing control into the hands of RENP's professional staff. During the final year, the project director used his control to put these agreements into operation in the area schools.

II. A SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS ON THE ANACOSTIA EXPERIENCE

In this section we present our conclusions based on the case material in the previous section. There are four major conclusions:

1. The conventional conception of policy making and policy implementation is inappropriate for understanding the history of the Anacostia school projects.
2. The first step in the implementation process--the creation of a local arena to define and implement policy--occurred prior to the definition of policy.
3. The Anacostia community arena developed its own agenda of concerns separate from those of either federal or local educational authorities. By using federal resources, as well as developing political resources of their own, Anacostia participants gained a degree of independence from both federal and local authorities.
4. The main problem encountered by participants (community, local, federal) was a persistent inability to agree upon a common policy for the project to implement.

First Conclusion: The conventional conception of policy making and policy implementation is inappropriate for understanding the history of the Anacostia school projects.

The Conventional Model: Without going into detail, the elements of the conventional conception of policy making and policy implementation presents the process as a bounded and sequential one. In this model, there are clear boundaries between the roles played by policy makers (usually elected officials) and policy implementers. These boundaries are established by a clear division of labor between policy makers who set goals and specify the means for implementing them and the policy implementers who carry out that policy.

Policy making and policy implementation are seen as sequential, the former occurs prior to (and is a necessary condition for) the latter. The model assumes that policy makers are capable of definitively stating a policy (as a specification of ends/goals and means). In order for this to happen, policy makers have to achieve some final consensus among themselves on goals and they must have sufficient information as to the means for achieving those goals. Policy implementers, for their part, are given clear direction by policy makers and are assumed to have both the technical capacity and the will necessary to carry out policy makers' directives. Since both policy makers and implementers accept the boundaries between their tasks, the process is sequential with policy making preceding policy implementation.

The conventional model has a number of things to

recommend it as a guide to research. First, it is consistent with democratic theory which is concerned with the ways in which the goals of legitimate officials, empowered directly or indirectly by electoral mandates and thus subject to change by voters, are translated into action by bureaucrats and others in the permanent structure of government.

Second, the model prescribes the order in which implementation research should be organized, beginning with the policy making, proceeding to implementation, and concluding with an evaluation of how well or how poorly the original policy goals were satisfied. Third, the model, which posits policy goals at the outset, provides researchers with objective criteria for conducting an evaluation of the success or failure of the implementation process.

Anacostia does not fit policy definition model: The history of the Anacostia projects does not follow the pattern posited by the conventional model. Policy was not definitively stated by policy makers at the outset; policy makers concentrated their attention on short-run goals achieved by the initial input of resources into Anacostia with little attention to long-term specific goals; policy implementers did not press for a clarification of policy prior to implementation; so policy making and policy implementation occurred simultaneously and continued on an

open-ended basis for the history of the project.

In this case, President Johnson and his White House staff were the policy makers who initiated the Anacostia Project in 1967. The White House sought to respond to a number of immediate problems through the promise of money and other federal support. These immediate problems defined the White House's proximate goals: maintain civil order in the District of Columbia; show movement and action on the problems of urban education in the District and elsewhere; demonstrate the effectiveness of the Great Society in order to build political credit for the upcoming election. Proximate goals had to be accomplished within the constraints imposed by limited resources, the need to get started quickly, and the bureaucratic and organizational limitations of the District of Columbia Public Schools.

The Johnson initiative--announcing an experimental project in a few Washington schools, whose characteristics were to be defined by community participants as well as District and Federal educational authorities--solved immediate problems while leaving both the means and long-term goals for the policy implementers to determine. By promising money, the White House was able to meet its immediate need for action and political credit. By focusing comparatively small resources ($10 million promised) onto a limited number of Washington schools, the prospects for dramatic results from limited resources were enhanced.

By leaving the means by which these results were to be achieved for others to define, the White House avoided the complex problem of specifying means in an uncertain and difficult policy area. And by sketching out a new bureaucratic arena--whose participants included community residents, federal and local school officials--the White House believed it was avoiding the difficulties associated with the District of Columbia Public Schools. Finally, the general goal of improving urban education nationally--by developing and proving techniques in a limited number of District schools--could be related to the input of limited resources promised in the Johnson plan.

Thus the proximate political goals of the Johnson White House were accomplished by the President's announcement and initial support. Long-term goals and the means for achieving them were left vague because policy makers were uncertain about what should be accomplished and how. In this sense, then, White House policy makers behaved in ways inconsistent with the conventional conception of policy making.

Anacostia does not fit the Policy Implementation model: Policy implementers--initially the U.S. Office of Education and District of Columbia Public Schools--had few incentives to press the White House for more precise policy instructions. The vagueness of White House directives constituted a resource for the implementers, giving

them considerable discretion in spending the promised new money. Both USOE and DCPS considered themselves more technically competent than the White House about urban education. Requests for further clarification might be interpreted by the White House as a sign of incompetence or foot-dragging on the part of federal and local educational authorities. So for a variety of reasons, policy implementers accepted the unconventional role of policy maker as an adjunct to their conventional role as policy implementers.

Second Conclusion: The first step in the implementation process--the creation of a local arena to define and implement policy--occurred prior to the definition of policy.

Since the Johnson White House did not clearly specify the policy to be implemented, federal and local educational authorities were given discretion to do so. These authorities--responding to internal organizational cues--used their discretion to create and legitimate a local arena whose job it was to both define and implement policy. Thus the first cut at policy definition was primarily to design a process for the definition of policy.

In a series of joint actions USOE and DCPS identified the Anacostia area as the recipient of the project, convened a series of neighborhood meetings to assess community response and to plan for a more permanent local

governing body, and contributed a few specific means for achieving educational improvements. Neither USOE or DCPS considered it their job to propose a comprehensive plan--specifying the relationships begween means and ends--on the community.

USOE avoided the role of planner for several reasons. First, congressional concern over federal influence in education had been voiced several times. Second, several USOE officials directly concerned with the Anacostia projects (including the Commissioner, a bureau chief, and a project officer) believed that community participants should be given primary responsibility for directing and defining the project. Third, no consensus existed among professional educators as to appropriate remedies for urban educational ills. In the absence of such a consensus, USOE officials reasoned, multiple approaches ought to be encouraged in hopes one might work.

DCPS, the nominal conduit for federal monies for Anacostia, avoided a central planning role for different reasons. First, funding for Anacostia was primarily federal and involved few claims on DCPS resources. Second, DCPS was in low repute among Anacostia residents and a dominant role by DCPS would have been resented.

Third, the central DCPS administrator most involved with Anacostia had only a few specific concerns which were already acceptable to community residents (in-service train-

ing of teachers, use of community aides) and so he did not have to take a more active role in planning.

While community residents were given the discretion to plan both means and goals, in fact USOE retained the right to review these plans and DCPS retained legal control over the Anacostia's project. In effect, then, the capacity of Anacostia to plan and implement remained constrained by federal and local educational authorities. These constraints become significant when the leadership of USOE changed and when DCPS was called upon to circumvent its normal administrative procedures to implement project goals. So while the community gained the right to determine the content of the project, by defining specific goals and means, this right could only be effectively exercised with the approval of USOE and DCPS. When one or both withdrew their approval, the developing Anacostia leadership sought to reduce the consequences of USOE-DCPS action through political efforts. This will be discussed in the next section.

Third Conclusion: The Anacostia community arena developed its own agenda of concerns separate from those of either federal or local educational authorities. By using federal resources, as well as developing political resources of their own, Anacostia participants gained a degree of independence from both federal and local education-

al authorities.

A role for community participants, originally suggested by the White House, was initiated by DCPS and USOE in the project's planning phase. The effect of the USOE-DCPS decision to use a local intermediary was to create a locally based and organized constituency for continued federal support.

The local organization took on a life of its own independent of the control and priorities of the educational authorities who created it. The Anacostia Community Planning Council which directed the planning and writing of the project proposal also assumed detailed responsibility for the administrative start-up of the project. The distinction between policy making and policy implementation quickly broke down; when the Planning Council dissolved in deference to the elected Community Board, it passed on this integrated rather than specialized pattern of administration.

While local groups did come up with a plan, external demands led to a process of revision. Over time these external demands took a number of forms: Congress reduced the amount of mo ney proposed by President Johnson, and demanded greater consistency and integration of program elements while federal educational authorities and their consultants requested greater explicitness in the relationship between programs and goals. Thus planning became a protracted process, and was not completed prior to the

implementation of specific program elements such as the selection of project staff and the election of community school boards.

In short, the community resident portion of the staff structure and some of the election mechanism was in place prior to the final definition of the policy the project was to implement. It is for this reason that the project organization took on a life of its own and developed organizational goals separate from those initially envisioned by federal and local educational ahthorities.

The Anacostia project boards became the central arena for distribution of money and programs. The Anacostia boards came to play a number of distinct organizational roles in the community: a source of material and status rewards for community residents; the legitimate representative of the community in its dealings with outside authorities in the federal and District of Columbia governments; the principal policy and administrative body for running project activities within Anacostia schools; and a sounding board for local concerns.

Over time, the many roles played by the Anacostia board brought the community into conflict with USOE authorities. These authorities concluded that the Anacostia project had neglected or performed educational planning and administrative functions poorly, preferring to build political support for its organizational maintenance.

In 1972, USOE decided to terminate support for the Anacostia Community School Project. By this point, however, the Anacostia Project had developed an ideology of community control which legitimated and further defined its role in the community. In addition, the project had developed a core of community supporters based on the material and status rewards it conferred. These core activists had, by this time, become experienced in mobilizing community supporters, as well as knowledgable about techniques for generating publicity and public support for their cause through the use of media and demonstrations. Finally, the project had gained supporters on Capitol Hill stemming from geographic proximity, shared values, and the perception of common enemies (The Nixon Administration). Thus, the Anacostia Project ultimately defeated attempts by federal authorities to terminate it.

Meanwhile the on-going organizational goals of the Anacostia projects dominated the agenda of the community board's concerns and consumed the energies of participants. There were many internal conflicts over the distribution of resources to project components and to schools. Persistent difficulties arose as inexperienced community residents had to cope with the bureaucratic intricacies of DCPS, complex even by large school system standards, in the hiring of personnel and acquisition of materials.

Inevitably these conflicts, within the community, the staff, and among board members, led to a series of contests

for control of the board. The effect of all of these immediate problems was to concentrate board and project attention and energies on meeting specific short-run goals. Few specific incentives existed for either long-term educational planning or for the overall coordination of these specific efforts.

Fourth Conclusion: The main problem encountered by participants (community, local, federal) was a persistent inability to agree upon a common policy for the project to implement.

The community, city and federal participants were unable to settle upon a single definitive policy for most of the history of the project. A definitive resolution means an agreement on means and ends, to whose fulfillment the participants commit themselves. We believe several factors explain this difficulty. There were differences in the preferences of major participants over goals and means. There were shortcomings in leadership. And there were changes in the organizational priorities of participants over time. Each of these helped to create a situation where preferences conflicted, and few effective means existed for resolving conflicts.

Federal educational agencies, the District schools, and Anacostia projects could all agree that improving the education of Anacostia children was an important goal.

But each participant defined the goal in a different fashion and preferred different means for achieving the goal. So at the practical level of what to work for, how to work for it, and how to evaluate the results, there was no real agreement among the participants.

A second factor explaining the inability to agree was turnover in leadership within the various organizations participating in the Anacostia negotiations. Each set of leaders brought in a different set of expectations and preferences about Anacostia, leadership, thus turnover produced a confounding effect on the negotiation process. At the federal level, the Anacostia project involved directly or indirectly: two presidents; two commissioners of education; and three directors or acting directors of NIE. During the same period, the District of Columbia Public Schools had six superintendents or acting superintendents; the Anacostia projects had seven project directors or acting directors, and numerous different elected board members. The pace of leadership turnover produced its own form of chaos. Each new participant was aware of only a portion of what had occurred before his/her arrival. Each brought new goals which led to the reorientations and readjustments within their organizations.

As a result of this process, the organizational priorities of participants changed over time. The Anacostia project came into being as an organization, and quickly

developed a stake in its continued survival. What had begun as a series of community meetings was transformed into an important actor in its own right. The District of Columbia Public Schools also changed its overall direction several times moving from a narrow emphasis on reading and mathematics (the Clark Plan under Superintendent Scott), to decentralization (Superintendent Sizemore), back to basics in "Competency Based Curriculum" (Superintendent Reed). USOE moved from a laissez-faire attitude of support for decentralization in Anacostia to a more hard-nosed emphasis on project activities and accomplishments. NIE entered its negotiations with RENP with the goal of producing goal-oriented, valid educational lessons.

III. THE LESSONS OF THE ANACOSTIA EXPERIENCE

Our finding that the Anacostia projects fail to confirm the descriptive accuracy of the conventional implementation model is not a new one. Indeed most recent students of implementation have found that policy making and policy implementation can occur simultaneously (Radin, 1977; Moynihan, 1970; Murphy, 1977; Bardach, 1977; Rein and Rabinowitz, 1977; Lipsky, 1978). These works have already clarified the conditions under which policy makers will initiate programs without defining either goals or means. Our first conclusion about Anacostia merely confirms those findings: time, resource and information constraints lead policy makers to initiate vague policies which implementers are expected to define. In this section, we are primarily interested in the implications of such findings for people interested in improving policy implementation.

We believe that the Anacostia experience is unusual in the length of time involved in defining and implementing policy. Agreement on a single policy was reached by NIE and RENP during the final years of the project's existence, and this policy was only fully implemented--project staff employed in delivering services to schools--within the final year of the project.

The initial policy making and implementation schedule was not met. Instead, there was a decade-long process of conflict and negotiations during which $10 million federal dollars and countless hours by community participants and federal administration were expended.

Even without a policy consensus, many things were accomplished through the expenditure of these resources: elective boards were established and functioned to represent community interests, parents and school people learned to work together, the District Schools gained an appreciation of Anacostia's specific needs and more local resources were devoted to that region. Yet federal policy makers' goal of the development/implementation of a single educational policy through federal-community cooperation was not accomplished until the very end of the project's existence. Such an agreement early in the project's history would have been important because it would have made for greater coordination of efforts and efficiency in the use of resources possible; additionally the technical lessons of such a clear policy could have been used to help other urban school districts. In this narrow but important sense, the Anacostia experience was a failure because policy was not produced and implemented in a timely fashion. Learning the lessons which lay behind these delays, then, will be the basis of our contribution to the study of policy implementation.

Our work on Anacostia, and the work of other researchers, pointed out the difficulties associated with defining a policy once a program is in operation. This has led some researchers to argue that policy makers should definitively state policies prior to implementation, converting the empirical claims of the conventional model into a normative imperative (for example, Lowi, 1969). Others have pointed out that policy makers who deal with complex and emotional issue areas lack the information and degree of goal consensus necessary for such policy pronouncements (see Schlesinger; Lindblom, 1968).

Whether or not the limitations on policy makers are as strict as this position implies, it is unlikely that their behavior will change. So we will confine our attention to examining how policies could be defined after policy makers have decided to commit resources to programs.

Once President Johnson made his initial commitment to an experimental school project in the District of Columbia, it was up to federal, local, and community authorities to define the policy to be pursued by that project. We believe three basic scenarios could be written whereby participants could have agreed upon a single policy and could have been realistically expected to implement that policy. These scenarios are plausible extrapolations from the facts, each leading to an agreement on a policy by a different route.

By comparing each scenario with actual events, we

can get a better appreciation of specific difficulties associated with achieving policy agreements through each route. The scenarios are: agreement through mutual adjustment; through bargaining; and through the use of political power.

The Mutual Adjustment Scenario: In this instance, participants arrive at a common policy through a process of mutual adjustment based upon commonly held goals. Game theorists call this a simple coordination game in which each participant voluntarily alters his/her behavior to achieve a common goal.[1] Social psychologists refer to these same relationships as "referent" power relationships.[2] In the educational change literature, McLaughlin's discussion of "mutual adaptation" is a good example of a policy arrived at in this fashion.[3]

The definition of policy in the mutual adjustment scenario is merely a formalization of a pre-existing consensus among participants. This scenario offers a number of advantages; it is voluntary, requires little coercion, and participants share a common incentive to cooperate and live up to their obligations.

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[1]Thomas Schelling, "Bargaining Strategies in Political Conflicts," How America Is Ruled: A Reader; Denis G. Sullivan, Richard F. Winters, Robert T. Nakamura, Jeffrey L. Pressman, eds. (New York: John Wiley & Sons) forthcoming, pp. 233-254.

[2]John R. P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, "The Bases of Social Power," in Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, eds., Group Dynamics (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1960), pp. 608-610.

[3]Milbrey McLaughlin, "Implementation as Mutual Adaptation," in Walter Williams and Richard Elmore, eds., Social Program Implementation (San Francisco: Academic Press, 1976).

While many interviewees talked as if the mutual adjustment scenario should have applied to Anacostia (i.e., "we are all interested in the children"), the requirements of that scenario were simply too high to make it appropriate as a means of achieving agreement on a plan. The mmtual adjustment scenario requires a high degree of consensus on goals, as well as a high degree of certainty about the means ofr achieving those goals.

Agreement on goals only translates to agreement on means when the technology for achieving goals is clear. Our case materials indicate that while some goals were shared, there was no agreement on the relative priorities of educational, organizational, or political goals. Furthermore, the technology for achieving the shared goals of improved education was far from certain and was itself an item of dispute (community involvement vs. in-service training, etc.).

The mutual adjustment scenario might have been effective in federal-Anacostia relations under different circumstances. Goal-agreement might have been achieved by the simple expedient of limiting participation to those who agreed. The decision to involve the community precluded such an approach. Agreement on means could have been achieved by stating goals for which "means" were already known as in nutrition and health programs. The decision to develop new approaches to urban education precluded narrow goals and/or certain means.

The Bargaining Scenario: Here participants arrive at a common policy through a process of bargaining. Participants recognize they have common and divergent goals, and seek the policy most favorable to them through bargaining. A bargain is struck, or a policy made, when each side has achieved as much as they believe possible. The policy in this scenario represents a series of obligations binding on both parties and usually includes specific incentives for compliance and disincentives for non-compliance. Thus, it is in the interests of both parties to live up to their obligations and to achieve the common benefits of the agreement. The Clean Air Act provisions on auto emissions, for example, has been defined and implemented in this fashion.

This particular scenario seems to have been the one adopted by NIE as a strategy during the latter stages of its negotiations with RENP. NIE tried to use its control over RENP's continued funding as a bargaining instrument to get RENP to formulate and agree upon a policy which could be implemented and produce educational results. NIE would contribute the financial incentive and technical help necessary to get the divided RENP board and leadership to agree on a single set of goals, and to develop the means to achieve those goals. NIE recognized that RENP had some divergent goals stemming from their definition of community control, but the bargaining strategy was intended to bring these goals into line with an agreement on an overall policy.

A number of factors worked together against the success of the bargaining scenario in Anacostia. At a minimum the bargaining strategy requires bargainers who are empowered to deal on behalf of their side and are capable of complying with agreement agreed upon.

Anacostia's representatives in NIE-RENP negotiations often lacked such characteristics since the community board retained the authority to dismiss project directors with whom they were displeased. NIE also tried bargaining with the board directly, but this was also difficult because the board membership was politically divided and was liable to change at periodic elections.

At other times NIE sought to deal with the District of Columbia Public Schools, the nominal recipients of federal funds for Anacostia. But the District leadership in the superintendent's office tended to be unstable because of their involvement in conflicts with the city-wide Board of Education, and were often unwilling to embroil themselves in what was considered an Anacostia problem.

A further problem was the inability of Anacostia participants to live up to agreements once concluded. Successful bargaining, after all, requires bargainers with the capability of enforcing agreements. In some instances, the means of compliance were beyond the control of Anacostia participants. The hiring and firing of project staff, and securing of supplies, was dependent on the cumbersome internal procedures of the District of Columbia Public Schools. The technology for training community participants for work

in the schools, for example, had to be developed with the help of outside consultants.

Finally, this scenario requires policies with realistic provisions for the enforcement of agreements. Unlike the mutual adjustment scenario, bargaining assumes that participants will interpret policy agreements according to their separate interests. The best mechanism is to "pay on performance," that is to provide the promised benefit of an agreement when a condition is met. For example, Medicaid payments are made to vendors after a patient has been treated.[1]

Unfortunately, such direct incentives were not available to NIE which had to pay for RENP operations in advance of providing the promised services. Furthermore NIE, like other federal agencies, had an incentive to "move money" through commitments to projects prior to the expiration of the fiscal year or risk losing a portion of their congressional appropriation. So, at times, NIE could not threaten to withhold funds until an agreement was reached or compliance occurred. Instead, it had to promise funds to the project and then bargain over their use, thereby reducing the effectiveness of their most powerful incentive, a financial one. Our earlier description of NIE's efforts to increase the frequency and specificity of negotiations

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[1]Robert and Rosemary Stevens, Welfare Medicine in America (New York: The Free Press of Macmillan, 1974).

is an example of NIE's attempts to work around these bargaining limitations.

Like the mutual adjustment scenario, the bargaining scenario might have worked better under a different set of circumstances. Had RENP been a more monolithic actor, with greater control over compliance then the bargaining scenario would have been more appropriate. Something like this did occur over the history of RENP, as the director gained more power and as the composition of the board shifted, but these developments took an inordinately long time. It is, after all, an extremely cumbersome bargaining scenario that requires the creation of effective bargaining agents before the process can effectively begin.

The Political Power Scenario: Political theorists agree that fundamental societal conflicts over values are resolved through the exercise of power. The use of power is appropriate when other means of deciding conflicts are unavailable. Power is usually defined as the capacity to make authoritative allocation of scarce resources. A policy definition and implementation scenario which follows from this view is that one party simply imposes their policy preferences on the other, and the other has no choice but compliance.

In such a scenario, federal educational authorities would have listed their requirements for a policy, and

Anacostia then would have to decide whether or not to develop a policy within the required framework in order to get federal funds.

Stated in such a raw form, the political power scenario seems unattractive because it conflicts with other values. In the Anacostia case, such a position is inconsistent with the values of local autonomy, with the vision of a cooperative federal-local partnership, and with federal agencies' conceptions of themselves.

Despite these and other misgivings, the prospect that power could be used as a substitute for final voluntary agreement remains an important one. Such power need not be exercised at the outset of negotiations. It might be applied when agreement is close but the final steps continue to elude negotiators. At that point, the authoritative exercise of power or the threat to use it could settle arguments and produce an agreement on goals and means.

The problem with this political power scenario is that for most of the history of the Anacostia projects, federal agencies did not have the option of using power authoritatively. In 1972, USOE tried to cut off support for the project and their decision was reversed due to the intervention of supporters of the project in the White House and in Congress. Similarly, NIE's use of the threat of termination was constrained by congressional "earmark" of appropriations for Anacostia and the threat of more

vigorous outside intervention. It was only after the prospects for such outside intervention waned, in the final years of the experiment, that NIE could plausibly threaten to use power to settle disputes.

Of course, one might simply reverse the political power scenario and look at the prospects for Anacostia imposing their preferences on federal agencies. The problem remained since the Anacostia project participants lacked authoritative power over the agencies. While Anacostia could call upon powerful outside allies to protect themselves from federal agencies, these outsiders did not and would not impose Anacostia's overall policy preferences on those agencies.

The prospect of outside intervention, then, prevented federal agencies from using the authority or power necessary to impose agreements. As time passed, the likelihood of intervention diminished--due to changes in Anacostia and in the political environment of Capitol Hill--and the ability of NIE to use the threat of power increased. Over time, RENP became more compliant as the strength of NIE's position increased. But again these changes occurred only after a decade of effort, and so cannot be considered a success.

Summary: We have described the history of the Anacostia projects, some conclusions based on that history, and some lessons for other federal efforts to plan and

implement policy through the use of community intermediaries. On that final point we have explored three alternative scenarios for gaining agreement on policy and for increasing the likelihood of faithful implementation. For each scenario we have described the reasons why the Anacostia experience failed to fulfill the necessary requirements. It is clear that these failings are not due to the faults of individual participants--each of whom pursued plausible, realistic and even laudable goals--but are due instead to structural shortcomings beyond the control of individual actors.

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(Appendix)

A SUMMARY OF CRITICAL EVENTS FOR HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE ANACOSTIA COMMUNITY SCHOOL PROJECT AND THE RESPONSE TO EDUCATIONAL NEEDS PROJECT

by

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For the National Institute of Education
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A SUMMARY OF CRITICAL EVENTS FOR HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE ANACOSTIA COMMUNITY SCHOOL PROJECT AND THE RESPONSE TO EDUCATIONAL NEEDS PROJECT*

June, 1967

Prof. A. Harry Passow, Columbia University, Teachers College, submits his report to Board of Education recommending major reforms in District Schools.

July, 1967

White House: Stephen Pollak (LBJ advisor for District Affairs) and Douglas Cater (advisor on HEW) arrange a meeting at the Brookings Institution. Meeting includes four White House officials, one from the US Bureau of the Budget, two D.C. school board members and Prof. Passow. Among the items discussed was administration support for financing Passow's recommendations. The cost would be at least $25 million, and LBJ aides proposed that D.C. be designated as an "educational laboratory". (Post 4/27/72). No action is taken by LBJ on that recommendation. During the Summer, LBJ aides worked on a reorganization of the District government, including congressional passage of a measure making school board elections possible.

Fall, 1967

USOE: A task force, inside the U.S. Office of Education (USOE), headed by Harold Howe, recommends the creation of a "model educational system" in Washington for about $10 million in the first year. The earlier suggestion, arising out of the Brookings meeting, was characterized as too expensive and too controversial. The new plan was described as one "particularly attractive way of getting a large impact on education for a small investment".

Local participation was seen as minimal. The task force proposal placed responsibility for the development of the new program in a "special council" working over five years. The "council" would be selected from the nation's foremost college presidents, deans, scholars and educational administrators. There would also be a "national advisory committee" composed of superintendents from the ten largest urban school systems in the country.

The D.C. Board would have to approve these arrangements, but after that its control would be slight (Post 4/27/72).

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*See glossary for abbreviations.

March 13, 1968

White House: President Johnson in his message on the District of Columbia asks Congress for $10 million in the 1969 Office of Education Budget to create a "major model school experiment in the District." He cites Passow report.

The $10 million would "launch" a new venture, which was to continue for five years. The effort was to "become a beacon to the school systems in the other cities of the Nation."

Nine goals are stated in the message: revive interest of citizens in schools, retrain teachers, bring students the best in teaching methods and materials, revise curriculum to make it serve the city's young, equip high school graduates with marketable skills, seek alliances between employers and schools, give children the chance to learn at their own pace (reduce both dropouts and failures), serve a section of the city where the needs of students and schools are the greatest.

President Johnson states that he expects the effort will result in a number of programs: pre-school, early childhood development, work opportunities for high school students, counseling and health services, a regular retraining system for teachers, and new levels of cooperation among the schools and other agencies serving the District.

The message includes what is described as the "new concept" of the "community school." Here the emphasis is on involving families in schools as well as making schools year-round centers for learning and recreation.

Responsibility for developing the "large-scale community school experiment" is given to the Commissioner of Education, the D.C. School system, and community service agencies in the District (LBJ message, 3/13/68).

White House, Congress: In the past, the United Planning Organization (UPO) had been used as a conduit for federal, Office of Economic Opportunity and other monies going to the District, around the usual Congressional procedures. Thus OEO through the UPO, along with ESEA Title funds, helped fund project in the Cardozo High School area, through the DCPS, specifically the Model School Division from 1964 through the late 1960's. Norman Nickens, Director of the Summer Planning Institute and the ACSP was named head of the MSD. (Larry Cuban's Study of the Model School District.)

March 13, 1968

USOE, DCPS: Commissioner Howe formally urges District school officials to come forward with proposals to implement the President's message. D.C. Superintendent Manning asks the Community Council, a group established to implement the Passow Report, to work on selecting an area for the demonstration.

Howe explained that the city must approach USOE for the funds, through proposals written with the help of consultants, and that "local education authorities will take the leadership role". USOE, Howe said, would have an "advisory" role (Post 3/14/68).

April, 1968

USOE: Memo from John F. Hughes, head of USOE compensatory education, to Commissioner Harold Howe II makes it clear that OE should take an activist role in the development of the LBJ project. Hughes arranges to get Mario Fantini, a consultant experienced in community control, to write the proposal "in clear terms" so the D.C. school board would understand it. Howe is asked to "continue holding his (D.C. Superintendent Manning's) hand during the coming week to be sure that all the proper moves are made" (Post 4/27/72). Federal officials had had differences, in the past, with ex-Superintendent Hansen's DCPS.

D.C.: On April 4, Martin Luther King is assassinated, producing large scale civil disorder in District.

DCPS: Meetings between representatives from D.C. schools, Mayor's office, Federal City College, the local community action agency, the Office of Education held to suggest criteria for selection of a demonstration site (RENP PIO chronology).

An ad hoc community committee designated by the Community Council (a group representing 75 organizations, established to implement the Passow Report) recommended that the Douglass Junior High School area in Anacostia serve as the demonstration area (RENP PIO chronology).

The D.C. School Board approved the project site, chose a project director, and appointed a chief consultant to advise in project planning (RENP PIO). Dr. Norman Nickens is listed as Project Director and Mario Fantini, the head consultant (in document dated August, 1968 from Nicosia file). Dr. Nickens was Director of the Model School Division, whose job included in-service training of teachers, as well as Executive Assistant Superintendents (see "Collapse of Model School Division", from Task Force study of DCPS and War on Poverty, House Committee on Education and Labor, June 1966). Mario Fantini had written extensively on community control of schools, and would serve as a consultant to the Ft. Lincoln Project in the District as well. Fantini also served as consultant to the Ft. Lincoln school project.

The schools selected were: Ballou High School, Douglass Junior High, Moten, Nichols, Birney and Stanton Elementary schools. (Post 7/16/68).

May, 1968

Federal Agencies: To develop new levels of cooperation between schools and other agencies serving the project area, an interagency task force was formed to coordinate federal resources and programs for maximum impact. (Friedman chronology, Post files).

June, 1968

Community: A series of preliminary meetings held with community leaders, principals of participating schools, teacher union officials, and teachers to set the stage for community involvement (Post chronology).

A "Community Information Conference" was held on June 15th. It was advertised in the press, radio, through handbills, and announcements in churches and community organizations. Several hundred people attended the meeting in the Bethlehem Baptist Church (Rev. Coates, pastor). Ten participants were selected to form the nucleus of an Ad Hoc Community Planning Council (hereafter referred to as the Planning Council), later expanded to 35 members broadly representative of the community. Plans were made for a month-long workshop. (Nicosia file).

Congress: The House Appropriations Committee approved only $1 million of the $10 million requested. Nickens said that the effect of the cut could not yet be determined: "We're not far enough in our planning to establish program priorities." Rep. Natcher, chairman of the D.C. Appropriations Subcommittee and ranking Democrat on HEW appropriations, asked pointed questions of Commr. Howe about the project (Washington Post, June 21, 1968). Speculation that Natcher irritated by "end run" around D.C. Appropriations because item was in HEW/OE budget, possibly to avoid MacMillan (confidential interview). Natcher warns that the project might have "too much" federal control (D.C. Appropriations for 1969, Hearings, p. 273).

July, 1968

Community: A month long workshop is held using $150,000 made available by the DCPS from its ESEA Title III funds for operational expenses. Participants received modest stipends of $15 per day. (Nicosia file, document based on interviews with participants), about 280 people (parents, teachers, students, community) were involved.

Participants were organized into a series of task forces. General Learning Corporation "catered" workshops with technical services for $25,000 (Post 1/5/70). The early childhood task force developed "a early childhood unit: with comprehensive supportive services for both children and their families and a solid educational program focused on preparing children for academic programs and developing a positive self-image". (Post chronology).

The secondary task force considered techniques to improve pupil-teacher relations, new approaches to curriculum improvement and development of courses in black history (Post chronology).

The adult education task force developed a comprehensive Adult Education Program to be part of the new community school approach to learning problems.

A youth group made program recommendations including a youth advisory board, sex education, computer programming, vocational guidance, and current business practices.

Each of the task force groups, as well as members of the Ad Hoc Community Planning Council, studied various types of community schools around the country before a structure for increased community participation in governing project schools was devised (Post chronology).

Daily sessions of these task forces are said to have been characterized by deep concern for community progress, much spirited discussion, and a lot of hard work (Nicosia file). Another interviewee recalls that the sessions started out with some name calling, "parents wanted the principals to make the teachers teach" but things improved.

A "Community Steering Committee for the Anacostia Demonstration of Excellence in Urban Education" list dated 7/24/68 (from Post files) lists members as including people from: UPO funded agencies (SE House, CHASE), several churches (including that of Rev. Coates, the chairman), business, and community.

Congress: During the planning workshop, the Senate (after the House vote to allocate only $1 million) recommended no funding at all.

Community reaction: Protest meetings were held, publicity generated, delegations went to Congress to press for full funding of the project (Nicosia file and Post chronology).

August, 1968

White House, Congress: White House aides work to regain funding for program. James Gaither (LBJ aide) writes Mike Mantos (presidential lobbyist) underscoring the presidential promise. Gaither drafts a speech for Sen. Robert Byrd saying that the cutting back of the project would be a false economy, the speech mentioned the work of "some of the best lawyers in Washington as well as by Anacostia residents" (Post 4/27/72). Sen. Byrd is credited by several interviewees with later restoring funds.

Community: The recommendations of the July workshops are submitted to a committee (representing all workshops) charged with writing the final proposal. Their work is reviewed and approved by the Anacostia Ad Hoc Community Planning Council (Post chronology).

The proposal outlines (in a section titled "What We Have") the problems: overcrowding, low achievement, inadequate housing, delinquency, and so on. The section on "What We Need" cites as the community's main priority "a voice in creating and developing our educational system." The number one recommendation is labeled community participation. Other recommendations include many items only one of which is in-service education for teachers indicating its relative priority (Nicosia files; Rice report on Anacostia).

Parent involvement was central to the report, and it envisioned their involvement in a number of areas: curriculum, recreation in the schools, participation in seminars, etc. The proposal recommended the establishment of a Community School Board with decision-making powers, and the plans for its organization are detailed in the proposal. A Community Planning Council was to function as an interim board during negotiations with DCPS.

In all, the Summer Workshop Task Forces produced 28 separate recommendations including budget figures in order of their priority (See "Anacostia Community School Project ... A Proposal ..." August 1968).

Consultants and Community: General Learning Corporation had been involved in the community task forces and proposals writing since the initial summer meetings. Robert Ellis described General Learning's role: "The goal was to make sure that the U.S. Office of Education understood what Anacostia wanted, and that Anacostia understood what the choices were." The workshops produced an inch-thick document, with a $15 million price tag calculated by General Learning. Ellis insisted that the citizens, rather than the company teams, wrote the programs. In a joint forward, Mario Fantini and Assoc. Super. Nickens called the document somewhat ambiguously, "the voice of the spirit of the Anacostia community" (Post, 1/5/70).

September, 1968

DCPS: The Anacostia Community School Project (ACSP) proposal is approved by the D.C. Board of Education and sent to USOE on September 18. USOE would study and fund it in accordance with the Congressional appropriation (see congressional level below).

Congress: The funding for ACSP would be based on the outcome of the House-Senate Conference, where the differences between the two houses would be resolved. The Senate had earlier voted to restore funding to $5 million and the House figure was $1 million (Post chronology).

October, 1968

Congress: The President signed the Appropriations Bill for the District of Columbia (PL 9473), including $1 million for the Anacostia Project (1/10 of original request) on October 10 (Post chronology). Speculation: Control over funding now in D.C. Appropriations process.

Federal agencies: The Project proposal sent to all members of the Interagency Group with covering letters from USOE asking for program commitments and possible funding sources. The Proposal also sent to four reviewers and returned with high recommendations (Post chronology). Speculation: The congressional cut results in a scramble to pick up additional funding in other budgets.

November, 1968

Community: The Ad Hoc Community Planning Council (ACPC) organized the Reading Task Force from its members and other community residents to the ACSP proposal into a well-defined plan of action for the Project Schools.

DCPS: A preliminary grant of $40,000 from the $1,000,000 allocated was made to ACSP through the D.C. Board of Education to hire a full-time Project Director and other key personnel.

Federal agencies: The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) has tentatively offered to fund the planning phase of the Early Childhood Unit, in the amount of $100,000, pending approval of the proposal submitted. Investigation of community interest in the grant was begun.

The Interagency group begins further search for funding from interested government agencies. The next meeting of the Group is set for early December, when these possibilities will be exposed in greater depth. (Post chronology).

December, 1968

Community: The Reading Proposal, completed by the Reading Task Force was approved by the Ad Hoc Planning Committee. This proposal was then submitted to USOE for review and funding. The Planning Council is in the process of organizing its Early Childhood Education Task Force to translate the early childhood section of the Proposal into a fully developed proposal using the Head Start Guidelines (Post chronology).

Community and consultants: General Learning Corporation had earlier volunteered the free services of two consultants (Polly Greenberg and Bea Epstein) to help with the reading improvement proposal. Ellis, of General Learning, insisted they had no designs on the subsequent reading program contract, noting that their consultants were often overruled by task force members. The December proposal totalled about $700,000, with $50,000 budgeted for outside technical assistance. At that point some task force members questioned General Learning's stake, but Ellis and Greenberg made it clear that they could turn where they pleased for services (several proposals were considered). Eventually General Learning won the contract for $49,750. The company stressed that the effort did not reach a break-even point because their consultant-team invested much time in helping to reduce friction among other participants (such as irate teachers), and to bearing unexpected

administrative burdens when project hiring was delayed (Post 1/5/70). Apparently, General Learning thought of this project as an opportunity to establish their abilities in educational consulting.

DCPS: Mr. William S. Rice, Director of the Special Projects Division, was designated by Superintendent William Manning, as the contact person for the DCPS for the operation of the Anacostia Project. The job specification for a full time Director for ACSP was agreed upon by ACPC and the DCPS, and made available for national distribution.

Federal agencies: On Dec. 9, the Federal Inter-Agency Group met with representatives of the ACPC to diseminate information about funding and consultative possibilities. Dr. Ann O. Stemmler was designated as USOE contact both for the Inter-Agency and the ACPC. She had initially been brought in as a consultant on early childhood development. A report of meeting sent to all participants. Subsequent to the Inter-Agency meeting, a representative of the Public Health Service met with Anacostia Planning Council to discuss this agency's possible assistance to the Anacostia Project (Post chronology).

January, 1969

Community, DCPS: Interviewing for Project Director.

Federal agencies: The Reading Proposal was reviewed by USOE and recommended for funding, subject to three contingencies: appointment of a Reading Project Director, strengthening of the substantive reading aspects, and the addition of a strong evaluation component. These contingencies were agreed to and incorporated into the Reading Proposal by the Reading Task Force.

Community: Recruiting begun for Community Reading Assistants (CRA) on January 15, 97 persons selected for the first training cycle (Post chronology).

February, 1969

Community and agency: Final agreement concerning the Reading Proposal was reached, the first ACSP component received a grant award of $726,000 (incorporating $40,000 for overall project administration). The reading component was the second priority of the Anacostia Community Planning Council.

Community: A final group of 90 Community Reading Assistants (CRA) completed a 15-day training period (Post 2/9/69) and were sworn in on February 20. Recruitment continued for the Director, and on a second group of CRA's (who were to begin training on Feb. 24th).

Mr. Edward J. Edwards, Jr., Principal of Turner Elementary School, served as Acting Director of the Reading Program, pending selection of a permanent director.

The ACSP moves into office facilities located at 2250 Railroad Avenue, S.E., and recruitment began for Program Developer, secretaries and other clerical personnel on February 17.

Anacostia schools (hereafter referred to as schools): The first group of trained reading assistants entered classrooms on Monday, February 24. Due to certain questions that arose relative to their proper function, a meeting of all those involved in the program was held on February 27. A group of teachers apparently uninformed about the program were unhappy about its initial implementation indicated their discontent by leaving the meeting. The remaining group aired their difficulties and, in many cases, praised the program. The ACPC immediately planned a series of meetings at each school to iron out difficulties. In addition, William Rice conversed privately with persons involved to help in clearing up problems. William Simons, President of the Washington Teachers' Union, also assisted with teachers in resolving problems relative to the reading assistants.

Community, DCPS, Federal Agency relations: Dr. Anne O. Stemmler has been designated as the USOE Project Officer, Mrs. Gretchen McCann as the Bureau of Research Liaison Office, Mr. William S. Rice, Director, Division of Special Projects, DCPS as the D.C. Schools Project Director (Post chronology). The DHEW memo setting out the internal BR BESE-OE working relations specified that the "Office of Education administration of the Anacostia Community School project will be carried out . . . with the intent of making the District of Columbia government fully responsible and accountable for the operation of the Project." Acting Commissioner of Education, Muirhead memo to Lessingner (BESE) and Boyan (BR), February 24, 1969.

March, 1969

ACSP and USOE: A presentation made by ACSP to USOE bureau chiefs on the Project's first anniversay.

The Community Education Component was submitted to and approved by the DCPS, and forwarded to USOE which requested clarification and amplification on certain points (Post chronology).

Community: The search continued for a Project Director.

April, 1969

USOE, ACSP: The Planning Council of ACSP worked on revising the Community Education Component and resubmitted it to USOE for approval.

ACSP: Mr. William Rice appointed Project Director; Mrs. Juanita Braddock appointed as Program Developer.

The Health Task Force met and prepared a questionnaire for submission to all Project principals to gather health statistics on the students. Each principal will nominate three teachers to form a health committee for his school.

Meetings were held among youth members to discuss possibilities of starting a Street Academy in the Project Area. Discussion held on the possibility of starting a STAY program for dropouts at Ballou High School.

ACSP, school relations: A weekend retreat was held for community members, principals, assistant principals, and teachers (Post chronology).

May, 1969

ACSP, USOE: The third revision of the Project Organization and Community Participation Proposal was passed by the Planning Council and submitted on May 27 to USOE.

ACSP: James Nutall appointed Deputy Director. Appointments to Innovation Team approved by the Planning Council, Training for the Team began on May 26. Project by-laws approved.

ACSP and schools: A reading fair for the demonstration of materials and methods developed by the teachers and CRA's held at Birney School.

ACSP, DCPS, schools crisis: On May 26, a group of teachers walked out of a PTA meeting in protest because Rev. James Coates (chairman of the Anacostia Community Planning Council, President of the D.C. School Board) asked that only parents be allowed to ask questions. On May 28, DCPS Superintendent Manning hand-carried 31 warning/reprimand letters and publicly delivered them to teachers at Birney Elementary School for their alledged misconduct at the PTA meeting. The teachers formally complained that they were reprimanded without a hearing. However, their dissatisfaction goes beyond the incident of May 26. Other issues involved are: a dissatisfaction with the Birney School Principal, a lack of communication within the school including lack of information on the Anacostia Project, some dissatisfaction with the way the CRA's were introduced into the classroom, a complaint that the Project is not involving the teachers, and the allegation that Rev. Coates is in a position of conflict of interest.

June, 1969

DCPS: A presentation was made to the D.C. School Board on June 2 to report on the progress and history of the Project. According to a document prepared for the meeting, the following schools are involved at this time. The elementary schools are: Birney, Congress Heights, Draper, Green, McGogney, Moten, Savoy, Turner. Secondary: Doughlass Junior High, Ballou Senior High. Total students: 9800 (elementary), 2700 (secondary). Staff: 617 (elementary), 198 (secondary). The budget is listed at $1 million, with the largest amounts to Reading ($686,000) and Project Organization and Community Education ($200,000).

ACSP, school relations: June 19, step three of the D.C. Schools grievance procedures as implemented in the complaint of the Birney Elementary School teachers. This involves an informal hearing by the Superintendent or his representative. All the teachers agreed to go through normal channels except one. The formal grievance is that they were reprimanded, the previous month, without hearing. Apparently the teachers were not satisfied with the results of step three, and asked for a step four hearing. Superintendent Manning stated that the letters constituted only a warning since copies

were not placed in the teachers' files. (A reprimand is placed in a teacher's file.) (The remaining one teacher had proceeded on her own and had now transferred from the Project.) The complaint is now in step four: a formal inquiry before the Grievance Committee of the Board of Education. If teachers are not satisfied with step four, they can request binding arbitration. Any dissatisfied teachers are allowed to transfer to other schools with no repercussions if they so desire (Post chronology).

USOE: The ACSP was awarded a grant of $273,933 for the Project Organization and Community Participation Proposal and the grant period was extended until November 30, 1969. This component provides the central administrative structure and the provision for an elected school board by December 1, 1969.

ACSP: The program hosted a conference on community schools, held at Howard University on June 21 to 23. A two-week workshop held for CRA's from June 17 to June 30.

Other federal agencies: CHASE (affiliated with the Poverty Program) provides money for two libraries open for eleven summer weeks.

The proposal for Department of Defense sponsored summer camp, at Fort Meade, for potential dropouts, was submitted to the USOE and accepted.

Project schools: The teacher retention rate for the Project is very high. Thirty-six teachers left the Project for all reasons, out of 430 teachers. This is an 8% attrition rate compared to the usual rate of 14% for DCPS. Anacostia had been plagued by a teacher turnover problem, new teachers getting appointed provisionally in Anacostia and then transferring out once their appointments were made permanent (Post chronology).

July, 1969

ACSP, USOE, DCPS: An open house was held on July 10 at the ACSP administrative offices. Among the distinguished guests were: John F. Hughes, Director of the Division of Compensatory Education; DCPS Superintendent William Manning; Deputy Superintendent Norman Nickens and OC Council Chairman Gilbert Hahn.

Congress: The House Appropriations Committee cut the request for $5,250,000 in President Nixon's FY 1970 Budget for Anacostia and Ft. Lincoln Projects ("New Towns") to $1,000,000. The full House endorsed the committee cut in the final bill, HR 13111. (Post chronology and Post article of 7/23/69).

Anacostia Reaction to House Action: Rev. Coates, chairman of Anacostia Community Council and President of D.C. School Board, said that the Anacostia experiment would not be able to begin planned new programs including: early childhood, job training for dropouts, and in-service training for teachers (Post 7/23/69).

Mr. Rice and others hold a press conference in which he says that it would cost $1.5 million to continue the present reading and community participation programs, with only $1 million, the program will have to be reduced to eight months or the number of programs will have to be curtailed.

An article quotes "mothers employed as reading aides" saying that their personal attention to youngsters in overcrowded classrooms has resulted in increased reading ability, expressiveness, and a fresh interest in learning among their pupils. (Post 8/7/69).

ACSP: The Summer Day Camp for Reading began on July 7, programmed for three weeks and 350 children. The Project administration began selection of a teaching staff for the Project schools. A proposal for a four week planning workshop for a Black Studies program was approved by the Planning Council and the USOE.

ACSP, Federal agencies: USOE approves the inclusion of Hayden-Johnson Junion High in the Project area, the school opened to relieve overcrowding in primary schools such as Turner. A joint six-week camp and educational experience for 48 (12-14 year old) boys is co-sponsored by the Dept. of Defense, the Mayor's Office, USOE and other agencies. It begins on July 14. (Approximately 140 boys throughout the city ultimately participated.)

August, 1969

ACSP, USOE: The Planning Council continued to develop their case for restoration of full funding by Congress, and on August 11 met with Peter Muirhead, Acting Deputy Commissioner of Education and John F. Hughes, Director of the Division of Compensatory Education. They were assured USOE would appeal the cut.

The grant for Project Organization and Community Participation was finally signed off on by the Contracts Division, Bureau of Research, on August 22. The Project now has operating budget for this component and consequently is able to hire administrative staff.

ACSP: The four-week Black Studies Planning Workshop began on August 4. The Summer Day Camp for Reading was extended until the middle of August (from three to six weeks) and at its peak involved over 600 children. Principals and assistant principals were appointed to Project schools by the Project administration. (Post chronology).

September, 1969

ACSP: This September 4 represents the beginning of the first full school year for the Project. During the month parents, staff, and students will develop a plan for each school which will be transmitted to the School Board and the Project Director on October 1. A mass meeting is held to develop a plan to deal with trouble in Project schools caused by "outsiders". Evaluation design for project being developed, proposals from independent evaluators being reviewed, Research Associate hired to develop baseline data.

DCPS: A large number of schools opened with shortages in supplies, books and equipment because of the District's inadequate distribution system.

The first step in controlling the entire school budget for the Project was made when the Acting Superintendent and D.C. School's Budget Office agreed to separate budget breakout of all expenditures for the Project schools.

USOE: The first draft of the Continuation Proposal for the Reading Component was submitted to USOE, reviewed informally and returned.

Congress: On Sept. 22, Mr. Harley Dirks, chief clerk of the Labor HEW Subcommittee on Appropriations (Sen. Magnuson) visited the Project. Sept. 30, the Republican Task Force on Urban Education visited the Project under the leadership of Rep. John B. Dellenback (Post chronology).

Several senators began an investigation of the problem of trouble caused by "outsiders" in schools on a citywide basis.

ACSP, DCPS: The Anacostia Community Planning Council demands dramatic action of D.C. School Board to end overcrowding. Percy Battle of Council says, "We are tired of being the backyard of the District." School Board member Julius Hobson urges Battle to consider going to court to stop school building in less crowded areas. Rev. Coates criticizes current Board plans for Anacostia as unrealistic given land acquisition difficulties. (Washington Star 9/25/69). School Board decides to give Anacostia priority on additional classroom space until the deficit in seats is eliminated. (Post chronology).

October, 1969

ACSP: Evaluation report submitted by Arthur D. Little, Inc. "Urban Education", Eight Experiments in Community Control (RENP PIO Chronology)

November, 1969

ACSP: The Planning Council had told OE that it would employ 12 community organizers to run an election for community boards by Dec. 1. But this became snarled in D.C. government red tape over hiring details. The Council hired the Westinghouse Learning Corporation (a competitor of General Learning), on a $24,000 contract, to help run the school board election. Westinghouse Learning hired 30 "campaign consultants" (from Howard University), and 100 local high school students for door to door registration of voters, as well as supervising the voting. In addition, teachers, Community Reading Assistants, people from SE House, CHASE, and United Poverty Organization helped. Voting was disappointing: only 437 of 6,005 registered parents and other nonschool affiliated residents voted; nearly 90 of 241 seats on neighborhood and community-wide boards were left vacant. Another election planned for December. A project

document interprets the results this way: "In the context of historical disinfranchisement and ingrown apathy, the election should be considered moderately successful." (ACSP The First Election, Nov. 1969). (See Post 1/5/70 and Post 11/29/69).

December, 1969

ACSP: On December 19th and 20th another election held for neighborhood and community boards. Again the turnout was disappointing: unofficial returns showed 433 votes cast, with 13 seats remaining vacant.

January, 1970

Press: Post article cites low election turnout as possible sign that Anacostia Project does not have community support. The piece says that the project seems to have fostered a mini-Establishment of: a few local citizens and outside consultants and federal officials (Post 1/5/70). This charge is made again later in the context of the decision not to continue the project.

February, 1970

Anacostia Community School Board holds its first meeting on February 28, 1970 after the November-December elections. Westinghouse Learning conducts the first meeting, supervising and giving advice on the election of officers and setting priorities. Emmett Brown is elected Chairman of the Board.

Other 1970 events

The several sources--RENP chronologies, newspaper stories, etc. are quite spotty on 1970 events. Specific things which happened included: National Science Foundation decision to fund data processing sources at Ballou High School ($13,100) grant. This precipitated a minor difficulty between Project and DCPS over the salary of the person to teach programming. Local boards at Moten and Turner Elementary participated in considering additions to the buildings in those schools, as well as in other deliberations, (lunch periods, etc.). Boards appear to be in a period of inactivity, possibly resulting from an inability to define their functions (Pinderhughes history). The Office of Education was in a period of turmoil: the change to the Nixon administration, the firing of Commissioner Allen (over Cambodian bombing), criticism of ESEA and its repercussions. In December of 1970, the Project is transferred between different portions of the Office of Education . One interviewee explains this move as an attempt to put ACSP into a safer, or more friendly place, in view of the new administration and changes in personnel. Dr. Ann Stemmler leaves USOE as Project Office for ACSP in September. Dr. John Hughes leaves USOE.

December, 1970

USOE, Bureau of the Budget: In the 1971/1972 Budget, Anacostia was a $5 million obligation. Caspar Weinberger, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, challenged the item and asked for a review. No instructions were conveyed to "kill" the project, but a request was made that it be examined. On December 17, 1970, a review was instituted shortly after the confirmation of the Commissioner of Education, Sidney Marland. The review was to be conducted by the Director of the Experimental School program (Robert Binswanger).

who was assigned managerial responsibility for the Major Demonstration Project (Binswanger memo, 10/1/71).

January, 1971

USOE: Binswanger focused attention on two concerns: recruitment and selection of a project officer and a total assessment and review of the Anacostia Project. The project had been without a project office for four months. A review of documents begins. An HEW fiscal audit was ordered in January (Binswanger memo).

June, 1971

USOE: A Project Officer is hired by OE, Ella M. De Legall (Johnston), [now Ella Kelly].

Throughout this period ACSP is being reviewed within USOE. A study team of prominent black educators is assembled, as well as black officials within USOE. There is concern over the white/black dimension of the ACSP and USOE. One early conclusion is that the project is not available in terms of 1968 goals; the goals as stated are simply not subject to measurement. Furthermore, DCPS and ACSP records (and other data) are poorly kept. Reports start coming back in May and June. Assessments are that the money is not helping the students in measureable ways.

ASCP: One interviewee described this period. "For eight months there were many acting people, but no one to relate to (at USOE). (Dr. Stemmler had left earlier.) Finally, Binswanger, the head of Experimental Schools, seemed to be in charge. He said that this is not our type of program, he was interested in experimental schools. . . . Binswanger said he was going out to hire people to look into the Project, and he hired six people to look at us. All during this time, Binswanger would give us enough money to last thirty days at a time. It was really killing to do a proposal every thirty days, and this went on from December to June" (Interviewee).

July, 1971

USOE: The HEW Audit Agency report is published. In brief, it stated that the central administration of DCPS, in a six-month audit period, had mismanaged $118,777 of project funds. (Binswanger memo). Money earmarked for the project had been used to pay the salaries of 13 teacher and aides not working in the program, D.C. administrators explained that some of the funds had been misspent because of "typing errors." Mayor Washington had also spent some of the money for the expenses of the city's criminal justice planning committee (Post 10/20/71).

(Significantly this Post article appeared during the termination controversy, indicating this information was released at an opportune time).

September, 1971

USOE, ACSP: The Southern Center for the Study of Public Policy, Clark College (Atlanta, Georgia) submits their evaluation. USOE interprets the report as unfavorable in that it noted the program suffered from serious problems in design and operation (Binswanger memo). The reaction of the ACSP is different; Mr. Rice is quoted as saying that the report endorses the project (Post 10/20/71).

DCPS: Super. Scott under criticism from civil rights groups and federal officials for his handling of special programs for low-income children (primarily ESEA) (Post 9/29/71).

October, 1971

USOE: Binswanger recommends that USOE phase-out the ACSP at the end of FY 1972, in his memo of October 1, 1971. After a discussion of possible political consequences of termination, Commissioner Marland accepts the recommendation and a letter is sent from Binswanger to Project Director Rice (interview and Binswanger memo) and it is received on October 13th (Interviews, Binswanger memo, chronologies and news accounts). Article on misspent funds based on HEW audit appears in Post (10/20/71).

ACSP: The project staff and other community groups rally support for ACSP: public meetings, press conferences, petitions (see other sections for specific items). One leaflet of the period says, "Our children will be deprived of their opportunity for a good education. Over 200 people will be added to the unemployment rolls. Dollars will be drained from the Anacostia Community" (October 20, 1971 leaflet). Rice calls the termination shocking and cites pupil progress in reading achievement (Rice, "Implications of Termination . . ." October 22).

Project mobilizes organizational support from varying federal, city and private organizations including the Federal City College, the Washington Urban League, St. Elizabeth's, etc. The Anacostia Community School Board also sends joint letters of protest with D.C. Supt. Hugh Scott and also with the D.C. Board of Education; the latter jointly formed an Ad Hoc Committee on Community Schools. Their letter said in part in reference to the termination: the Board of Education and the Anacostia Community School Project "join in unanimous indignation at the abrupt termination of the Anacostia Community School Project. . . . It is an insult to the right of self-determination for the black citizens of the District of Columbia, and an abortive attempt to kill the model for excellence in urban education being developed for other Anacostia-like communities across the country" (D.C. Citizens for Better Public Education Files).

USOE, ACSP, "sit-in": Two hundred supporters of ACSP, transported in three D.C. school buses, go to USOE to protest Binswanger's decision. The event is covered by the press and television. Binswanger attempts to explain decision, but is shouted down. One person says to him, "if you don't tear it up, we don't assure you a safe passage out of the room." Binswanger said that his decision was based on 19 reports, and could be appealed to Commissioner Marland. In addition, there were about 90 minutes of speeches including one by Rev. Coates. A woman remarked, as the meeting ended, "next time we'll bring the school children" (Post, Oct. 22, 1971).

Binswanger was accused of acting arbitrarily and as following a "Nixon ordered" budget cut. Binswanger said in his memo that the cut was made because the project "was unable to successfully document that it had made significant progress toward the fulfillment of its original objectives," and it showed no evidence of the capacity to make changes, and he criticized it for the lack of community-wide participation and failure to develop contacts with local agencies to meet long-range needs of the community (Star 10/22/71), (Post 10/19/71).

The result of the merting was the granting of an extension period of 45 days, during which the community board will appeal the cutoff to Commissioner Marland; Binswanger noted that the appeal would be heard directly by Marland. The reprieve was interpreted by Emmet Brown, chairman of the community board, to mean that the project would have until December 6 to make corrections and a final decision would be made in January of 1972 (Star 10/22/71).

October-November, 1971

ACSP, Congress: Delegations went to the Senate and gained the support of Sen. Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee for Labor-HEW. (RENP P10 Chronology). Letter and telephone calls from Senate offices start coming into USOE asking about the basis for the termination decision. One interviewee speculates that since most of these communications came from liberal Democrats that the ACSP was seen as part of the dispute between the Nixon administration and Senate in education matters. This theme is echoed in a column by William Raspberry (Post 11/17/71). Others saw the cutoff as a choice by Nixon administration to end a Johnson project.

November, 1971

ACSP: Board elections held during the week of November 15-19, out of a possible turnout of 24,000 people, 22,628 voted. This figure compared favorably with turnout in the Ward 8 city school board election of November 2 in which turnout was 2,318 (Post 12/12/71). The election was publicized heavily, and it was seen by ACSP as a chance to demonstrate community involvement. One leaflet of the period says: "Stop the Murder of Our Children's Education"; "If the Project Goes, So Does Extended Day, Data Processing, Head Start, Follow Through, Adult Education, Community Involvement"; "Get Out and Vote!" (Leaflet, 11/17/71).

A press release, signed by Board Chairman Emmet Brown, called the Binswanger decision precipitous, arbitrary, and reflective of his lack of understanding of Anacostia (Press Release of November 11, 1971).

White House: Nixon aides express concern over news accounts about termination of ACSP (Interview).

December, 1971

Other Groups: The respected District of Columbia Citizens for Better Public Education, through its Executive Director, Nancy Harrison, urges USOE to reconsider their decision on ACSP. While admitting the project's shortcomings--citing the Clark College Report and Binswanger memo--Harrison says that the decision-making process to date has been inadequate for reaching a justifiable conclusion about the ACSP. USOE made the decision, but responsibility for it rests with DCPS and ACSB as well as USOE. (Post 12/6/71).

Appeals to the decision are prepared. Covington and Burling, lawyers, draw up a Memorandum of Law in Support of Appeal of Anacostia Community School Board. The Memo notes that Binswanger's decision was reached without conforming to "due process rights to notice and a hearing" and the decision is in violation of the separation of functions requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (C.B. Memo, December 1970).

USOE: A study group is working within USOE to discuss ways of salvaging the project; the group appointed by Commissioner Marland includes Richard Fairley (head of Compensatory Education).

January, 1972

USOE, ACSP: Commissioner Marland refuses to reverse the Binswanger decision. At the same time he offers the prospect that Anacostia may receive funds from a new federal program ("educational renewal"). The D.C. schools had blamed USOE for failing to give Anacostia the autonomy and long-term funding it needed. The ACSP will continue until August of 1972 (continuation grant), the status of the 149 community people working as aides (making from $5400 to $6200 per year) and 50 other employees is uncertain after that (Post 1/2/72 and Star 1/1/72).

At this point an extended series of negotiations between old ACSP, USOE, and DCPS began for continued funding in the form of a new project. Funds were made available for planning such a project and a five-person Task Force (including a representative from the Anacostia Community School Board) was created. The Task Force Director was Elizabeth A. Abramowitz (Nicosia file).

School Year 1972-1973

ACSP: Seven additional schools added to Anacostia Community School (Friendship, Garfield, Hendley, Leckie, Patterson, Simon, and Hart Junior High).

DCPS: The new superintendent, Barbara Sizemore, decentralizes the school system with the creation of five regions. Anacostia becomes Region 1, and William Rice is named as Superintendent of Region 1. For a period he is both Director of the ACSO and Region 1 Superintendent, until September when Julian West is made Acting Director.

March, 1972

Albert Pearsall elected Chairman ACSB at reorganization meeting for recent election.

August, 1972

USOE, ACSP: The proposal from the task forces (called "Phase I" proposal) submitted to USOE by Elizabeth Abramowitz. It is approved in principle, but funding was withheld pending further planning. Proposal bears the name Response to Educational Needs Project (RENP). Negotiations around this first RENP proposal shifted from desk to desk at USOE (Nicosia file).

ACSP: During this time, most members of the ACSP staff, including some 75 CRA's and 12 community organizers were released.

September, 1972

RENP: Julian West, an assistant to the Superintendent in the DCPS special projects office, is appointed Acting Director of project. He proceeds to try to hire the project staff to implement program.

USOE, NIE: The funding agency changed from USOE to the newly created National Institute of Education (NIE).

October, 1972

Congress: In their appropriation for the recently authorized NIE, the Senate Appropriations Committee underscores the political importance of RENP by noting in their report: "The committee wishes . . . to mention its endorsement of the District of Columbia school project funded from this appropriation" (Senate Report 92-1297, October 12, 1972, pp. 30-31). A line item of $5 million put into FY 1973 NIE budget for Anacostia (Datta memo).

ACSP/RENP: Evaluation of ACSO by BLK Group.

Evaluation of ACSP by BLK Group, headed by Dr. Eugene Beard during the last year of operation. The report criticizes the absence of documentation and evaluation activities, but also notes that "The major evaluation finding was that the Anacostia Community School Project was so underfunded and understaffed at the central and component administration levels that adequate project management was impossible" (BLK Report, Oct. 13, 1972).

November, 1972

NIE, RENP, DCPA: NIE critique of Abramowitz document (on RENP) given to RENP, a detailed operational plan was also requested at this time. (There would be almost two years of very intensive work, and massive technical assistance from NIE before they judge the proposal fundable in February, 1974.) (A number of project officers deal with the project at NIE, including Tom Israel and Lance Hodes.)

January, 1973

ACSB begins planning for upcoming election.

February, 1973

NIE, RENP: Acting Director Julian West submits Operational Plan/Interim Report to NIE. The proposal puts primary emphasis on instruction with secondary concern in community involvement.

March, 1973

RENP: After a long search, R. Calvin Lockridge (from Chicago) is hired as Project Director. Lockridge has been associated with Dr. Martin Luther King's and SCLC's activities in Chicago, and later with the Black Strategy Center. Previously Evelyn Taylor, formerly in charge of Instructional Program of ACSP, is appointed to be RENP Director of Instruction. She has general charge over the in-service, on-site programs in reading and mathematics. Her background and emphasis is on the reading program. Other staff are also hired including the business manager, Mr. Sood.

NIE: NIE sends critique of West document, cites: lack of adequate program strategies, greater need for research orientation, and recommends the use of consultants and NIE assistance to develop plan (RENP PIO Chronology).

March through June, 1973

NIE: George Sealey becomes Project Officer for NIE in May; he has had extensive experience in the New York City school system, serving for a time as a high school principal and also working with the United Federation of Teachers.

NIE, RENP: As soon as Lockridge comes on as director, he becomes involved in developing another plan for NIE (following rejection of West proposal). Lockridge hires consultants to help him, and writes a proposal without extensive community consultation. The proposal goes through a series of negotiations with NIE, and is revised to meet objections. NIE is working under a deadline imposed by the ending of FY '73; if the money is not committed to the project before June, it is lost to the Institute and Anacostia. Director of NIE Glennon approves the plan, with reservations before June 30. There is concern at NIE over lack of sufficient detail and the relatively unclear definition of goals (Interview).

Congress: Senate Appropriations Committee Report is highly critical of NIE for what it considers obscurity in NIE's goals and failure to assert a role of leadership. The report cites the D.C. schools project (referring to Anacostia) as a potential success, and criticizes NIE for giving it short shrift (Senate Report 93-414, October 2, 1973).

The House Appropriations Subcommittee Summary, in another context dealing with NIE, makes what can be considered a contradictory demand. Their report "strongly urges the Institute to avoid a situation where a flurry of activity occurs in June causing a hasty use of funds on questionable projects. It would be far better to let funds lapse and revert to the Treasury rather than expend funds on projects that otherwise would have been rejected on their merit. Further, the Committee does not want a recurrence of a process used last year of the Office of Education where

certain projects awarded after July and backdated to the previous fiscal year" (House Appropriations Subcommittee Summary, House Report 93-305, June 21, 1973).

June, 1973

RENP: After the Lockridge proposal is submitted to NIE--titled "Systems Approach to Improved Academic Performance and Evaluation Design"--the Area Board says it is disturbed over the program described. Apparently there is concern over what they consider insufficient emphasis on community participation. On June 28, a Pre-Implementation Plan submitted by Board to NIE. Conflict on Board over Dir. Lockridge, and his proposal, continues and he is fired by Board. Differences also occur over expenses incurred by Lockridge.

During this summer the number of schools in what becomes the Anacostia Community School Division increased to 26 with the inclusion of Ketchem, Kimball, Malcolm X, Orr, Randle Highland, Stanton, Beers, 16th and Butler St.

August, 1973

NIE, RENP: NIE sends letter to Floretta McKenzie, Acting DCPS Superintendent, expressing concerns over: the termination of Director Lockridge with whom an agreement on the proposal had been reached and conflicts between the two June proposals. A joint meeting is requested with representatives of RENP, Area Board, and DCPS (RENP PIO Chronology).

RENP: Peter A. Lewis is appointed as Acting Director. He had previously directed the community component of RENP and had been in DCPS prior to that.

Fall, 1973

ACSB: Discusses acceptability of Sealey sitting on the screening committee for the new Director. The Board also begins discussion for arrangement for Board elections by December 1973 or January 1974. It sets up a task force and hires Dr. Robert Martin of the Department of Political Science at Howard University who suggests that at least three months are needed for proper procedure, so election is set for January 29, 1974. Martin also writes a very detailed election manual. Board also begins to deal in some detail with plant operations and maintenance problems of schools. Begins corresponding and meeting with William Coxe from DCPS Building and Grounds.

NIE, RENP: The joint meeting is held. Planning for a proposal agreeable to all parties began in the Fall, with the organization of a RENP Task Force by the DCPS. It was composed of the following: DCPS (6 members), Anacostia Community School Board (5), Council of School Officers (principals--23), Washington Teachers

Union (4), RENP staff (7), reading specialists (2), RENP consultants (2), and NIE (1). The chairman of the Anacostia Community School Board served as chairman of the Task Force.

Two responsibilities defined by NIE guidelines were assumed by the Task Force. The first was to formulate a "plan for planning" (Phase I). This plan was submitted in late October (Peter Lewis, "Plan for Proposal Development and Scope of Work"; October 25, 1973). The second was to prepare this proposal for operative Phase II (RENP PIO Chronology) (Nicosia file).

The main work of the Task Force was done in subcommittees: Reading instruction, mathematics, counseling, community organization/education, management support, and Phase II plan (Nicosia file). In all, some 85 persons involved. Subcommittees met almost daily during planning (late into the night and on weekends). Proposals were presented to the whole Task Force; those passed went to the Anacostia Community School Board for review and approval. Steps were taken to solicit appraisals and suggestions from principals and teachers not involved on the Task Force: luncheons, questionnaires, other meetings produce several hundred responses from people in twelve schools (Nicosia file).

NIE: The active role of NIE was apparently unusually intensive for those federal officials involved. The NIE considered itself as being extremely supportive of this prospective grantee (Nicosia file, other memoranda). (Some community interviewees did not share this estimate.)

November, 1973

RENP, DCPS: A "Memorandum of Understanding" signed by Anacostia Community School Division Board and the D.C. Central Board of Education. Discussions with NIE continue.

December, 1973

ACSB: Board member, Kathleen Holly, also member of the RENP Task Force, conveyed Acting Director Peter Lewis' comments on the difficulty in meeting NIE deadlines for submission of the program proposal because of NIE's slowness in providing component guidelines.

NIE: In these months, NIE brings on 10 consultants to help consider the RENP plan.

February, 1974

NIE, RENP: A "Proposal for a Cooperative School--Community Program to Foster Improved Academic Achievement Among the Children of Anacostia," submitted to NIE (RENP PIO Chronology). A later memo describes this as: "After almost two years of very intensive

work and (relative to other projects) massive technical assistance, a proposal was received in February 1974 that gives promise of being fundable" (Datta memo, November 10, 1975).

Review of the proposal indicated that either a re-write or many grant conditions would be required before the proposal was fundable. Rather than require another re-write, the 41 specific grant terms and conditions were negotiated (Datta memo).

RENP: In late Winter of 1974, the Parent Community Involvement Component started to reconstitute local school boards. An election was held for both local and area boards. Calvin Lockridge, the fired director, put together a slate of candidates. There were also a number of other rival candidates. Charges were made that some had engaged in unfair practices: pro-Lockridge staff people were said to have used office materials in his behalf. James Baldwin, of the D.C. Office of Human Rights, conducted a formal investigation and the non-Lockridge winners of the election were ultimately seated (Interview). (See also article in Post 3/12/74.)

March, 1974

Congress, NIE: Emerson Elliott, Deputy Director NIE, meets with Harley Dirks (chief staff person for Senate Labor-HEW Appropriations Subcommittee) about supplemental appropriation hearing for NIE. Dirks expresses interest in D.C. schools project, and tells of plans to visit facilities. Dirks and Dom Ruscio (staff person for education) indicate strong interest in an NIE "tour" of Anacostia (Elliott memo, March 12, 1974). (Dirks is sent a press release announcing the grant award to D.C. schools in early June.) The NIE was under intense criticism from Congress during this period (see subsequent months).

RENP: Elections for the Area Board and for the local school boards were held in March 1974; the PCI began to work with the local boards. . . . James Baldwin, of the D.C. Government's Office of Human Rights, conducted a formal investigation and the Lockridge slate winners of the election was ultimately seated (see also article in Post 3/12/74). Lockridge himself was not seated, but nearly all of his slate was; most became very active with the board. (ACS Board minutes 1974, 1975).

April, 1974

ACSB: Installation of new Board Members and organizational meeting of newly elected Area Board. Eugene Kinlow elected chairman. He suggests staggered terms for members and that standing committees be specified in the by-laws.

May, 1974

NIE, DCPS/RENP: Grant awarded by NIE to DCPS/RENP. RENP authorized to use their $2 million USOE carry-over balance plus $2,250,000 in FY '74 NIE funds to implement the program's five components: reading, mathematics, parent involvement, management and evaluation. DCPS Super. Barbara Sizemore, concerned with NIE's grant terms and conditions, becomes involved in negotiations. All were considered, by NIE, to be strategies in service of the objective of "improving the reading and mathematics achievement to the level of non-inner city children" in grades K through 12.

RENP requested two years to complete the project, asserting that implementation would be fully completed by June 1975, and the summative evaluation would be conducted in school year 1975-76. A fallback date was suggested by reviewers for an evaluation in 1976-77.

No additional funds were to be made available: two years would cost $6 million ($4 new plus 2 carryover).

RENP: Albert Pearsall, former ACSB chairman and RENP Task Force Chairman, dies during meetings with DCPS over ACSB's future.

Funding under both circumstances (meeting the schedule and "stretch" period) was contingent on satisfactory fulfillment of the grant conditions, and on evidence that reasonable levels of implementation had been achieved. Refunding was scheduled for completion by August 1975 (Datta memo, November 10, 1975).

The earlier draft proposals written by the Task Forces included "peer tutoring" but the Board was told that NIE had decided not to fund that. There was also some misunderstanding about the amount of money; one Board member saw it as "several hundred thousand dollars less than asked for." The Board debated the time frames for meeting grant terms and conditions. One member said of the time that NIE seemed to understand the community control portion and was willing to accept it, but decided later on that NIE was not particularly interested in this component (Interview).

At that time, the parent community involvement (PCI) component had about 24 community organizers and five senior community organizers (supervisors). The Board argued, to NIE, that they considered the PCI component the essence of the program.

June through Summer of 1974

Congress: The House Appropriations Committee Report is extremely critical of NIE; they cut the request FY '75 budget substantially, and state their belief that NIR has not assisted "state and

local education agencies through dissemination of research information and newly developed programs and practices" (House Report 93-1140, June 24, 1974). (NIE will later emphasize utilization and dissemination in their negotiations with DCPS about the ending of RENP.)

RENP: The role of director had been vacant following the resignation of Peter Lewis (appointed August 1973). He continued to attend Board Meetings after June of 1974 when Valerie Green, an assistant principal in DCPS, is hired as Project Director. The screening committee who hired her consisted of Gene Kinlow (chairman of the board), Barbara Smith, Louise Hutcheson, Kathleen Holly, Super. Rice, and George Sealey of NIE as a non-voting member. Green spends the summer implementing grant terms agreed to in February: developing programs (and presenting them for board approval), establishing positions within DCPS (for trainers of teachers), participating in many staff and board meetings, getting the reading and math programs into operation.

NIE, RENP: Some differences between NIE and RENP over the grant terms and conditions: who was to pay for what (particularly consultants), how much money was available, willingness of DCPS to facilitate implementation by speeding up procedures.

Fall, 1974

Congress: Again the Senate is critical of NIE, recommending zero funds for it (money is restored in House-Senate Conference). The committee again cites the D.C. schools project as an example of a successful project (Senate Report 93-1146, September 11, 1974, p. 84).

Winter, Spring, 1975

RENP: The heads of reading and mathematics components are hired -- disaggregating the old position of director of instructional component into two positions -- and trainers of teachers and trainers of aides are also hired. The Anacostia Community School Board is expanded and now consists of 32 people who are elected by the community (either directly or to local boards). Board training takes place. Eugene Kinlow and other board leaders are characterized -- by interviewees from DCPS, NIE, and other places -- as highly capable. There are also problems developing: conflicts on the staff (between Director and Director of Reading Component); some complaints over too few resources devoted to mathematics trainers as opposed to reading, some complaints by trainers of teachers that there is too much supervision and by others of too little.

Summer, 1975

RENP: Director Green is dismissed by the board citing conflicts with the staff and what they consider inadequate speed in implementing plan. Evelyn Taylor, former head of Instructional Component and Director of Reading, is made Acting Director (Interviews).

Fall, 1975

RENP: In mid-October, Director Taylor is replaced by Larry Riddick (head of RENP's Summative Evaluation who had joined DCPS in early August). Director Taylor's exit is attributed to administrative difficulties, Acting Director Riddick lasts six weeks in that position. (The position is being advertised during this period, and it is filled in December, effective in January.) In the meantime, the Board takes an active role in managing the program and the negotiating with NIE is handled by Board members, including Chairman Kinlow.

NIE: NIE identifies what it considers problems with RENP to date for their internal discussions. There are problems in leadership turnover and quality techniques of instruction, qualifications and abilities of aides, noncompliance with previous grant terms, poor definition of roles of aides in schools, and nonimplementation of the math component. In addition there are other organizational problems: turmoil in DCPS over Superintendent Sizemore; nonresponse by DCPS to a General Accounting Office Audit on RENP funds; and the nonspending of funds caused by delays in implementation. NIE feels limited on what it can do because they are dealing with a grant, not a contract (Datta memo, Nov. 10, 1975).

NIE, RENP negotiations: The Community Board and NIE started negotiating for an extension of their grant; this negotiation goes on from early fall until December. The Board negotiating team according to an interviewee consisted of three members of the board, the senior staff of RENP and Superintendent Rice of Region 1. A continuation proposal was submitted in October, NIE review of the proposal led to a decision to extend Phase I

(implementation) to May, 1976 to put RENP into practice in at least ten schools. This decision was based, in part, on recommendations from external reviewers. If RENP achieved implementation by May, 1976, they would receive another year of NIE support until the completion of Phase II. Failure to achieve implementation would mean that Phase II funds would not be awarded and the Project phased out. (Total NIE funding of RENP from September 1972 through June of 1977 would be approximately $7,000,000.) (Funding History in RFP.)

In November, NIE indicated that there was a maximum of $2 million in FY '76 funds plus carryover of $500,000 for the 18-month period in question. The budget approved for the program was $2,257,858 (Datta memo, July 2, 1976). (A disagreement developed later between NIE and RENP over the conditions of the 18-month extension RENP interpreted it to mean that if they succeeded with their goals in six months the following 12 would be automatic, while NIE did not.)

December, 1975

RENP: RENP personnel rolls are cut almost in half. The formative evaluation component is eliminated from the RENP offices and the summative is removed from DCPS.

NIE decides to take the responsibility for a summative evaluation of RENP out of hands of DCPS and RENP, because of what it considers prior non-performance, and searches for a third party to conduct it. The decision is based, in part, on external reviews of RENP's own summative and formative evaluation.

January, 1976

RENP: Dan Jackson is hired as Project Director, and he begins the full implementation of the program components. The leadership positions in the project are not completely filled. The position of Asst. Dir. for P.C. I is vacant. Director does the following things: starts "evening out" and reorganizing resources between math and reading in the schools, places the community organizers in the schools under the direction of on-site trainers of teachers (now called facilitators), and makes personnel changes in several key positions (Interview).

ACSB meets with NIE formative evaluation team from Gibboney Associates commissioned in January, 1976.

February, 1976

NIE, DCPS: DCPS informs NIE that unexpended funds from the previous year were actually $660,000 (not $500,000). DCPS is the recipient of the grant, and they handle the money for RENP, their accounting practices are frequently slow and complex.

NIE: NIE decides not to have the excess $160,000 revert to NIE but rather reserve the money for dissemination and other non-RENP use (Datta memo, July 2). RENP contends the money is "theirs" and should be given to the project. NIE offers $100,000 for DCPS utilization and dissemination, but later reduces offer to $80,000.

ACSB: Board holds annual organizational meeting with election of officers and committee chairpersons.

DCPS, NIE, "Utilization Plan": Superintendent Reed appoints Dr. Jim Guines (DCPS Asst. Superintendent for Instruction) to be responsible for working out a utilization plan. The plan is supposed to show how the DCPS will use RENP results in the system; NIE offers $80,000 to implement this plan but expects the DCPS to pick up bulk of costs. Guines is instructed not to commit the DCPS to additional expenditures, but to get the NIE grant. He and Dir. Don Jackson begin negotiations with NIE.

April, 1976

Congress: The House Appropriations Committee again reiterates their support for "dissemination" activities on the part of NIE of research results for the use of local schools; the Senate inserts a similar line. Significantly no specific mention is made, for the first time, of the D.C. schools project in the Committee reports (House Report 94-142, pp. 20-21, April 10, 1975; and Senate Report 94-198, June 18, 1975, p. 24).

NIE: The Institute had funded a four-month formative evaluation of RENP in January of 1976. The report, by Gibboney Associates, is delivered in April and recommends continuation. The report concluded that RENP was implemented.

May, 1976

NIE, RENP: A meeting is held to discuss the compliance of RENP with the conditions of the earlier agreement. Among the items discussed is funding for one additional month during the summer for project staff.

June, 1976

NIE: Process for Summative Evaluation of RENP began in 1975 continues. NIE announces contract for summative evaluation to Gibboney Associates.

July, 1976

NIE: Recommendation to Director Hodgkinson that RENP be given a Phase II award is approved. There are some differences between the RENP request and the award, including an item on summer salaries; this provokes a conflict between NIE and RENP.

RENP, NIE: NIE decided not to authorize money for summer salaries for training activities; so the staff of RENP would have to be furloughed. NIE reasoned that little actual training activity would occur at that point (Datta memo, July 2, 1976).

Dan Jackson, Project Director, responds with an attack on NIE in the Washington Post. He is quoted as saying that the program will have its staff laid off for August because of a government agency's refusal to "honor" a funding commitment. NIE Director Hodgkinson reiterated the NIE commitment to the project (Post, July 19, 1976).

September, 1976

RENP, DCPS: Chairman Kinlow makes a presentation to the D.C. Board of Education Budget Hearing (September 21) proposing that DCPS "re-program" some of their existing funds to pick up RENP expenses so that the program can continue beyond the end of federal funding.

1977 events to date

RENP: Dir. Jackson receives a Reduction In Force (RIF) notice for RENP employees from DCPS. This is an exclusive RIF, confined to RENP, and it will be appealed under DCPS procedures. Its effect would be to terminate the program employees. There are additional complications: tenure and permanent status of RENP employees within DCPS, the legality of an exclusive RIF, and so on. The Anacostia Community School Board works on a plan to continue as many RENP employees as possible; as of now the best prospects are for facilitators (trainers of teachers) who could either be trainers in DCPS or revert to teacher status; the chances are less good for CRA's and CO's (although some such job slots exist in DCPS).

RENP, DCPS, NIE: A final utilization and dissemination plan is negotiated and approved.

NIE: The Summative Evaluation of RENP is underway.

Glossary of Frequently Used Abbreviations

ACSP: The Anacostia Community School Project.

Area Board: The Anacostia Community School Board.

CO: Community Organizers.

CRA: Community Reading Assistants as classroom aides.

DCPS: District of Columbia Public Schools.

NIE: National Institute of Education.

PO: Project Officer for federal educational agencies.

Post: The Washington Post

RENP: The Response to Educational Needs Project.

Star: The Washington Star

UPO: United Planning Organization.

USOE: United States Office of Education.